Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange

Various Meanings of "Implicit Faith"

This is a very rough division of different senses of implicit faith. It’s NOT definitive. But, each grouping has important and significant differences that need to be heeded. Even where nuance might be needed or even correction, this is all meant to be based upon Thomistic foundations.

A. Meaning related to Dogmatic Development—Implicitation as unfolding of the truths of the faith over time

B. Meaning regarding implicitation among various persons right now
B1. The way that some Catholics today have implicit faithful in some mysteries (one would speak of maiores and minores)
B2. The way that some Orthodox today have implicit faith in some mysteries
B3. The way that some Protestants today have implicit faith in some mysteries


C. The way that those who were directly involved in salvation history had truths of faith — Development of Revelation
     - Mosaic Revelation
     - Revelation during the age of the "law of nature" (as they used to say)

D. Implicit faith in the distant cases of those who are saved by a kind of surd in voto baptismi.  This is necessary for the case found even in Pius IX.  (Although, when he speaks of those who follow the natural law, though they know not the gospel, he does somewhat naturalize this process. It makes it sound as though God will give supernatural recompense after a life of natural rectitude. But in fact, it is a question of implicit, supernatural faith, founded upon a very weak noetic foundation.)

Such implicit faith is also acknowledged by Scholastics prior to this, and also by Hugon, Garrigou, and even, to a degree, Fenton; I think it is given excellent analysis by Maritain, Journet, Labourdette, and Jean-Hervé Nicolas.  (I am thinking here of the case analyzed in the article on the Immanent dialectic of the first free act, by Maritain.  As Nicolas points out, this is different from a pre-volitional, natively positive inclination that would be a kind of anonymous Christianity on the model of K. Rahner.)

Person and Common Good - Or, Why I am Frustrated about the Whole Affair with De Koninck

[Another facebook post…]

[This is going to be a bit rambling and ranty…. I hope most of the latter tone was taken out, at least….!  I have had thoughts about this affair for going on ten years now.  This is all written in a spirit of fraternal brotherhood and _always with a willingness to be called to account in charity._  I was perhaps too flippant at first—who isn’t on social media?...—but the remark was based on thoughts that I have had for years and also somewhat emotionally on the basis of the utter lunacy of claiming that Garrigou is a personalist.  Interestingly, too, if people push too much on this, you’ll see that on the application of the somewhat-troublesome person /individual distinction, Garrigou is almost the same as Maritain.  I have deep respect for Dr. O’Neill, but I think on this issue that if he performs a “rapprochement” between RGL and CDK he will find, against his liking , that he will drag JM in tow.]

 

So…. Perhaps… I’ll gladly acknowledge, at least, that I am tougher on De Koninck than perhaps I should be.  The whole affair, however, is quite unfortunate in the lineaments of how it unfolded. First and foremost he actually never directly addresses Maritain himself. It’s all by way of insinuation in the original volume, and the very lengthy follow up article (longer than the original book, actually), is a response to Fr. Ignatius Eschmann, whose defense of Maritain is deserving of critique.  De Koninck rightly notes the problem concerning how Maritan is basically interpreted two different ways: by Yves Simon as being in substantive agreement with De Koninck (and I think Simon is correct, and ultimately knows Maritain’s thought / writings much better than Eschmann); but by Eschmann as being in disagreement with De Koninck.  If nothing else it bears witness to the need for deeper reflection by Maritain.

 

Now, there were two levels on which I tend to move regarding this affair.  First and foremost I think that, completely based upon the text themselves, that one can say that De Koninck never directly addresses _Maritain_ or his own thought.  Moreover, he is claimed to have said to Simon privately (as reported in records one can find at the Josais) never to have read Maritain.  That’s fine, but then all of his epigones should not act as though he ever wrote against Maritain or Maritain’s articulations.  At best, he wrote against one of Maritain’s followers, and not his ablest.  I remain unconvinced that there actually is any substantive difference between the Maritain and De Koninck, even if there are (important) nuances of difference.  Maritain regularly avers to the primacy of the common good.  He relativizes (whether too much or too little, the _general_ point is correct, though I’m more than happy to concede the vestiges of liberalism in him) the political order and the political common good, along the same lines as Aristotle.  While one might claim that he denies that the vision of God is a common good, what he actually says is that in this case there no longer is a distinction between the “private” good _as orderable_ to beatitude and the separate common good, which is here no longer separate or distinct in any way but, in fact, actuates the intellect and the will immediately—for in patria the act in question is the divine act elicited in the immediate vision of God, subjectively elevated by the light of glory.  Such knowledge and love is the Godhead itself.  In another sense, however,  as he does note there is a distinction here, insofar as comprehensive knowledge of God (and supernatural love equal to that) is God’s alone.

 

I will concede that one might wish to push him on aspects of this argument, for fear of a liberal reading of the distinction between the “private” good (an expression itself not without problems) and the “common good.”  But a facebook posting is not the best place to try to decide the exact meaning of an author.  I would in any case, council that it’s not so simple as to say Maritain = Mounier let alone even more radically personalist folks.

 

So, the point of this first level is that there never was actual substantive engagement between De Koninck and Maritain.  Whatever might be said about the former writing against Eschmann, it is not equivalent to saying that this was an affair that they settled _concerning Maritain himself_.  Whoever was at fault for that, it does in any case make the story more complex.

 

Second, on the issue of the person / individual distinction, I myself have always found this to be a ham-handed way of handling the (very real and important) fact that the _political_ common good does not exhaust the whole good of the human person, even in the natural order – at least according to an Aristotelian conception of things, in which contemplation (granted, of the “separate Common Good”) has primacy.  (One could add more here about the relationship between such natural contemplation and, for example, the political order’s own need for religious acts.  But, that gets into a different territory.) I thought I had a copy of Fr. Guilbeau’s thesis. (I swore someone gave me a copy of it once upon a time… Not sure if my sleep-deprived mind burped up that thought from nothing…. I wanted to see how deeply he engages with the theme in those upon whom Maritain depends.)  In any case, a full and fair study of the topic would require not merely an exact reading of Marie-Benoît Schwalm, OP (from whom it was first taken), but also the many places where Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange himself deploys the distinction, himself actually inspired on the level of what we could call (for lack of better terms…) the theological metaphysics of the Incarnation: in Christ, the individuation of human nature and the Divine Personality of the Word are really distinct.  Garrigou discusses it in this register in the following places:

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Thomistic Common Sense, trans. Matthew K. Minerd (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2020), 288–270, 308

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The Trinity and God the Creator, trans. Frederic C. Eckhoff (St. Louis: Herder, 1952), 155-156.

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Christ: The Savior, trans. Bede Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1950), 119ff.
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, De beatitudine (Turin: R. Berruti, 1951), 85-87 and 372.

 

He makes the exact same political usage as Maritain (again, not lacking the weaknesses that come with this usage, though also not with a denial of the primacy of the common good) in:

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “La subordination de l’état à la perfection de la personne humaine selon S. Thomas," Doctor Communis 2-3 (1949): 146-159; in Philosophizing on Faith, ed. and trans. Matthew Minerd (Providence, RI: Cluny Media, 2019), 183–204.

 

 

And, if I might add a third level, the attribution of “personalist” to Maritain, though used even by him in the relevant essays, is not at all the same as the personalism of 20th century France.  This is somewhat the same tone as one finds in Existence and the Existent, trying to say: we Thomists really have the true existentialism.  The labels “personalist Thomist” and “existential Thomist” do more to confuse than illuminate the nature of the approach to Thomism which was that of Maritain.  (The latter, for example, would put him and Gilson in the same camp.  They most definitely were not......)

 

So… If nothing else, that is where my frustrations come from.

More Vexation: "Ahistorical Thomism"

Another save from a Facebook post….

Another lovely little text to file away in that favorite folder of mine ("Data in contrast to the lies you were told in your youth concerning the pre-conciliar Church, especially concerning scholastic authors").

(Before citing this, bear in mind that the author, though a Thomist, does not assert a kind stupid claim of Thomistic superiority over doctrine. Moreover, he very carefully makes sure to affirm significant conceptual development over the course of dogmatic history [without, however, development in the objective concepts grasped through those formal concepts]. Finally, too, just as one of my addons, he is always cited approvingly by Garrigou-Lagrange, and the latter is cited by him approvingly. I say this not to hold up Garrigou as some end-all-be-all [which I have _never_ said or claimed] but, rather, just to present, yet again, more little proofs that the simplistic anti-scholastic, anti-neo-scholastic narrative is unfair and a kind of bullying. No, I'm not accusing Larry Chapp here. In the end, he is actually willing to pull back any rhetorical excesses. He doesn't prefer neo-Scholastic writers, understandably, because of their clunky and isolated way of talking only to themselves, at least very often. So, my ire here is more at a kind of Zeitgeist, even among a certain kind of Weigelian conservative. [And even Weigel probably deserves kinder treatment than I give him.] Above all, I have in my crosshairs the unfair characterizations of "ahistorical Thomism" by Bishop Robert Barron. Also, before you think I'm falling into the normal traditionalist complaints about Bishop Barron, please see my website where I clarify this under a "thought" that is tagged with his name.)

Okay, the Quote:

"Thirdly, historical knowledge regarding the various ways that Christian doctrine has been formulated, through the course of various eras and in the various writings of particular doctors, theologians, or schools, imposes grave duties upon dogmatic Theology, especially in our era. For the history of dogmas bears witness to a kind of marvelous multiplicity and diversity of formulations in Christian doctrine, a fact that was less well known or at least less fully considered by earlier theologians. Therefore, the proper office of modern theology will be to show: the equivalence of particular formulas; the continuity and identity of doctrine through its changing formulations; and, especially, how defined formulas are equivalent to the successive formulations found through the course of tradition. Such work will bear the greatest of fruits: theological argumentation will gain from it much greater strength and efficacy; dogmas will be considered from various perspectives; many teachings—whether of the Fathers, the doctors, or of the various schools—which at first sight appear to disagree with each other will be shown to be entirely consonant, or at least more easily able to be reconciled with each other; the various teachings of the schools will come to be seen in light of the various (though not opposed) ways of formulating the doctrine of faith, thus preparing the way for the resolution of many controversies."

"In short, I dare to assert: assiduous and subtle consideration concerning the various ways that doctrines have been formulated is the key for a fruitful investigation of the teaching of Sacred Scripture, the Councils, the Fathers, and theologians."

Reginald Schultes, OP, Introductio in historiam dogmatum

Response to Larry Chapp (Re: Weigel posting)

Larry Chapp also invited me to say something to him on facebook regarding my rage about Weigel. I figured I would put it here for the record. To be clear: I think very highly of Larry


Glory to Jesus Christ!

Dear Larry,

 

First and foremost, you’re going to see that I’m quite saucy above in my response.  (For quick reference: https://www.philosophicalcatholic.com/blog/2022/10/12/vexation-aimed-aroused-by-weigel

 

However, take it to be like the sauciness that you yourself like and do with such great Christian vigor.

 

Jon’s remark is mine too. He and I have a book that is a total of over 160k words on this topic.  40k word intro and then translations of all the major OP responses during the “nouvelle théologie crisis.” 

 

On the term “neo-scholasticism”: I stick by my guns.  Yes, it is post-leonine Thomism.  But, first and foremost, I’ll just say it again: the only fully (note that adverb, which is before the adjective) real Thomism is the Thomism that doesn’t reject the Thomist school.  For saying such things, I’ve had people from UST blow up at me online.  Fine.  I’ll never be hired somewhere “reputable”.  If people are that petty, that’s fine.  I’ve never said that they shouldn’t publish.  I’m just saying that one will always be a schizophrenic Thomist who also reinvents wheels with a chronolatrous presentism that always goes back to Thomas’s texts as though we are the ones who only now can read them aright.  Look at how many wheels have been reinvented these past decades.  It’s so tiresome.  Theology and philosophy seem to be the only disciplines that wish to condemn themselves to never progressing for real—for one never wishes to admit that some acquisitions can be definitive—lest one’s own libidinous desire for novelty might be limited by the cold hand of the past (a hand which in fact cradles us and provides the very conditions for any true progress).   

 

I’m not anti-Gilson.  I’m not even anti-Mercier. I’m not anti-De Finance.  I’m not anti-Fabro.  I’m not anti-Wippel.  I’m not anti-UST.  God in heaven, read Fr. Emmanuel Durand’s forthcoming book most of which I translated and all of which I edited.  I found it profound throughout.  It is not my style of Thomism, and I do think something is perhaps lacking when one doesn’t engage with the Thomist school.  But, I think that it’s all profound and is utterly legitimate theology in a broadly Thomist heritage.  (I am anti-Maréchal, but that’s because he seems to have gone way too far off the range…..). But, I am a staunch defender of the prerogative of the Thomist school.  And damned be me if I hold my lips for fear of repercussions that I’ll never feel, given that I’ve long ago torched all possibility of a normal career.

 

Anyway, the expression “neo-scholasticism” is at best an extrinsic and very vague historical denomination.  What’s the point.  It’s just like saying, “Roman Catholic folks who wrote, in all sorts of ways, with all sorts of presuppositions, generally touching in with Thomas and other scholastics, all after Aeterni Patris.”

 

(To understand what I think about training in Thomism, see this essay by John Cahalan:

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5eda794851ef816b04d5f4d5/t/5ee5085ccda9177fb9184634/1592068188935/Hudson14.pdf

 

Also, this one by John Deely:

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5eda794851ef816b04d5f4d5/t/5ee4e5e88a33630b03883e73/1592059372145/Ciapalo05.pdf

 

On the manuals, take a look at my florilegium from Garrigou.  This is my position.  I’ll defend to death that he wasn’t a manualist.  He was a Roman professor, and hence was marked by the limitations that came with that (and they were real limitations).  But, I’ll fight unto the Ragnarök / Götterdämmerung to defend the claim that Garrigou wasn’t a manualist.

 

Florilegium: https://www.philosophicalcatholic.com/quotations/2022/10/12/florilegium-of-garrigou-quotes-on-the-manuals

 

I have more than once had Roman Catholic Traditionalists contact me to try to reinstate “the manuals”.  I’m not interested in that.  I think there are some good manuals (and _a lot_ of dross).  In point of fact, just recently, when I saw that Prümmer’s short work was republished, I thought, “My dear Lord!  Why wouldn’t they at least translate his 3-volume manual.  But, even better than him was Merkelbach – though more technical and longer.” But, when people cry for the manuals, what they are crying for is a kind of saving from the nebulous state of theology today.  You and I agree that is true.  Good textbooks are what they want, but no few of old manuals were all too marked by the neat kind of mediocrity that is all too human—especially if you are going to teach a broad swath such as seminarians, who are not all looking to be theologians.  Okay, so we need faithful textbooks.  But that doesn’t mean that the silver bullet is found in something merely because it is called a manual.  In any case, if the brief Prümmer were all that one used, it would at best be a useful factbook.  But it would also distort one’s view of Moral Theology, even according Thomism.  (From the start this is true, if you just read how briefly and superficially he discusses what falls the Thomistic treatise on beatitude.)

 

But, now that I’ve said that, I’ll draw down the ire of some trads around my neck…. I hope, though, it earns me some credibility as an independent party….

Vexation aimed aroused by Weigel.....

I have updated this slightly, in the hopes of taking out some of my sauce directed at George Weigel. He has striven, of course, through his long life to be a faithful son of the Church. And, if I were in a different mood, and he were attacked by the Trads, I would all the studden start defending him with this much spice. But, I nonetheless am disappointed with his characterizations of Garrigou-Lagrange… Thus, what I say stands. Few will read it anyway… I merely wanted to respond to an interlocutor online. It spilled over into immense vexation. Remember, most of this is stream of consciousness…. And not much edited.

I lost my patience today regarding something the recent text by George Weigel related to the anniversary of Vatican II. It was mostly because of its ignorant half truth (=lies) about Garrigou-Lagrange. I get a bit testy. Oh well. It doesn’t really matter, but here it is for the record. It’s all so funny. I am actually a pluralist who will defend Eastern prerogatives. But, I am also a Thomist and know way too much about Garrigou’s history and work not to be angered that the ol’ Grandee of the Pope St. John Paul era finds it necessary to continue propagating these things. I actually want Communio people and even very conservative Thomists to get along. But I cannot accept this kind of thing without at least saying something.

These remarks are totally off the cuff on a day when I really had no time to do it… No editing, just raw Appalachian Thomist Ranting.

The full quote, which was sent to me (which I then looked at in its immediate context):

Thomas’s theology, Chenu argued, ought not be reduced to a closed system in theological manuals. If the Church reappropriated the Christ-centered, sacramental, and contemplative or mystical elements of Thomas’s thought and spirituality, settled truths could be presented in a fresh light that was more suitable for proclaiming Christ and Christian truth to modern skeptics. [fn. 33] The Neo-Scholastic Thomistic thought that dominated Roman theology from the Modernist crisis to the Second Vatican Council was exemplified by Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP: the “Sacred Monster of Thomism,” as he was dubbed. Garrigou was a stalwart defender of the deductive or syllogistic style of theology and the precise vocabulary it employed, seemingly convinced that neither could be changed without grave damage being done to the truths of Catholic faith. (To take one example: Garrigou criticized the doctoral dissertation of a young Polish priest named Karol Wojtyła because the Pole had not used the term “divine object” of God, preferring to speak of the more personal nature of the human encounter with God. [fn. 34]) Garrigou also played a considerable role in the Roman critique of ressourcement theology and was thought to have been a driving force behind Pius XII’s cautionary 1950 encyclical on what the Pope deemed “false opinions threatening to undermine the foundations of Catholic doctrine,” Humani Generis, which took particular aim at the work of Henri de Lubac. Long interested in mysticism and the Christian call to holiness, Garrigou was not merely a theological logic-chopper. His identification of the ressourcement movement with Modernism was misplaced, however, and Garrigou played no significant role in the preparation of the Second Vatican Council or at the Council itself. Nonetheless, a post-conciliar Church would eventually find use for the finely honed distinctions of the Neo-Scholasticism he embodied, although it was some thirty years after his death in 1964.[fn. 35] ”

Sentence 1

Thomas’s theology, Chenu argued, ought not be reduced to a closed system in theological manuals.

 

Commentary

Setting aside concerns regarding Chenu, who is a mixed bag—though, it should be remembered: (a) Garrigou had wanted Chenu to be his successor at the Angelicum; (b) that when the whole affair at the Saulchoir broke down in the late 1930s / early 1940s, from what I understand Garrigou tried to be moderate.  What is more, on the latter point, he wasn’t alone in his concerns—merely note Pietro Parente’s own remarks about Chenu, but also the closely related articles by Marie Rosaire Gagnebet. Not unrelated, too, were similar concerns by Charles Boyer, SJ.  (But the latter two were also arguing against other authors too.). I’m willing to be disabused of this claim that Garrigou was not uncharitable toward Chenu in the affair at the Saulchoir—though such disabusing must be based upon documentary evidence, not Fr. Chenu’s later bickering to people like Gilson.

 

Moreover, the genre of “manual” is slippery.  And this slipperiness is used as a cudgel.  There are multiple genres that were written by Latin theologians:

Manuals: Textbooks for seminary formation, often arranged in a very summary thesis / proof format.  Garrigou regularly would critique this significant weakness of manuals.  See here for where I have gathered a florilegium of his remarks to this end:

https://www.philosophicalcatholic.com/quotations/2022/10/12/florilegium-of-garrigou-quotes-on-the-manuals

 

Theological treatises (Tractatus de…): Generally broken up like the treatises in St. Thomas’s Summa, or perhaps something modeled on later Latin scholastic breakouts of theological topics.  These would sometimes share aspects of the manual style.  Nonetheless, they represented quasi-monographs in scholastic style, dealing with a given topic.  Franzelin was not a Thomist, but think of his works.  Or, think of Billot, again not really a Thomist, but yet again scholastic monographs, not teaching manuals.  Or, think of Emmanuel Dorozo’s 11,000 pages on the sacraments—recognized WIDELY for their mastery, even by those who disagreed with him on points.  They were Latin Catholic theological monographs.  What is more, even things like Doronzo’s “manual” set on dogmatics (which was unfinished) is like a truly MA / PhD level textbook.  If such things exist for medical school, why not for theology?

 

Commentaries: Many of Garrigou’s works are actually more like shorter-form commentaries, not manuals.  Fr.  John Saward once said this to me (positively, as he had by that point undergone his theological transition), and it totally opened up what it was that RGL (and others too) were doing in text like this.  It seems like splitting a hair, but it’s not unimportant to distinguish genres.

 

Thus, the term “manual” is thus used as cudgel to daze those who don’t dare look further into things but, instead rest upon the authority of someone like Chenu, so as to tell oneself that all was dark in an age before.  It’s far more complicated.  (Also, as an aside, there is a true and real sense in which one can call the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas a manual.  As I age, I see the weakness of certain structural points in the ST (and yet also see other aspects to its particular grandeur, which is so very much that of its own author’s mind).  But I think it would be insanity—especially for Latin Catholics—to throw away the ST just because it was a quasi-manual.

 

There was, yes, a tendency of Latin Scholastics to talk among themselves in their neat little bubble.  And this tended to make Thomism feel closed up.  And yet, read Marie Michel Labourdette’s response to this kind of claim by the SJs he was dialoguing with during the Nouvelle Théologie crisis, and you’ll see that he and the Toulouse OPs didn’t think of Thomism as closed.  As for Garrigou, it’s a mixed bag—he’s an older Thomist, yes.  And yet, if you pay heed to him—and here, sir, I’ll venture that I’ve read more of him than Weigel—you see all sorts of ways in which he was an open-minded thinker.  (A huge amount of Maritain is Garrigouvian, even into the former’s old age.)  Just because petulant young men in the 30s-50s were frustrated with that old man—as I am now (not so young anymore) frustrated with Weigel—doesn’t make their frustrations COMPLETELY correct.  Imagine if I called Weigel (WHICH I HAVEN’T): Overly-optimistic boomer Catholic on the dole of the mainstream and totally detached from the actual state of things, claiming a springtime when we live in the dying days of fall for this season of history.  Boy oh boy do I want to say that about him (which many in my generation do), but I actually think it would too simplistic.  I would ask only the same level of reservation regarding those who came before Chenu, the latter of whom was himself also human and given to licking his wounds with nasty invective.  

 

 

Sentence 2

If the Church reappropriated the Christ-centered, sacramental, and contemplative or mystical elements of Thomas’s thought and spirituality, settled truths could be presented in a fresh light that was more suitable for proclaiming Christ and Christian truth to modern skeptics.

 

Commentary

“Reappropriated” these elements.  So sad that they were lost.  Garrigou’s generation—and that of Gardeil, whom Chenu and Congar appropriated to themselves unjustly, unless they want to admit that they should recognize how much they owed to Garrigou (Congar even owed his OP vocation to Garrigou’s preaching)—was already well into the renewal of moral and spiritual theology which involved all the “reappropriations” spoken of by Weigel.  Everyone thinks of Pinckaers on the question of Moral Theology.  And yet, I have shown in various articles, that you find all of this a generation earlier.  In a sense, Fr. Pinckaers is rather unimpressive in comparison – nothing new but only felicitously easier narrative approaches to the same content.  But, consider Marmion’s immensely profitable theology of life in Christ.  Very early in the 3 Ages, Garrigou recognizes and recommends this as of immense profit to one’s understanding of the spiritual life.  Moreover, the contemplative / mystical life was at the center of Garrigou’s many fights in spiritual theology.

 

What is more, Garrigou wrote for his age against the skeptics of his age.  This is clear in his more philosophical works.  That he wasn’t writing as Chenu wanted in the 1930s-50s is a sidelight.  Garrigou did not fight such engagement.  (More later when I respond to Larry Chapp.) Many “neo-Thomists” (more on this term to Larry below) engaged precisely in this.  It is WAY too variegated a world just to act as though they did not.  There were many other “conservative Thomists” whom Chenu didn’t like either, though they too were involved more than mere repetition of little lisping words out of manuals in ecclesiastical Latin (as Chenu—and Weigel implicitly through him) makes them out to be.

 

On the sacraments and the liturgy, yep, they were often weak, but even here, someone like Marmion shows a real engagement with the liturgical movement (and stout defense sometimes against wrongheaded SJ criticisms of the OSBs on this score).

 

Sentence 3

 The Neo-Scholastic Thomistic thought that dominated Roman theology from the Modernist crisis to the Second Vatican Council was exemplified by Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP: the “Sacred Monster of Thomism,” as he was dubbed.

 

Commentary

The dubbing first.  This was François Mauriac, and it was not some kind of universally held titling of Garrigou.  Many, especially the younger, didn’t like him (though…. he also had many loving younger students, as you will see if you read the _Angelicum_ in memoriam remembrances of him).  But the use of this title by Weigel is rhetorical garbage unless it is qualified. 

 

Also, more on “Neo-scholastic Thomistic” thought later to Larry.  First of all… there were still great Suarezians during that period, even if less so than in earlier days.  Moreover, there were many sorts of Thomism, not all as Neo as others.  But more on that to Larry below.

 

(And, to be clear, I personally don’t like the kind of Thomism-über-Alles attitude of the age.  As a Ruthenian Catholic, even though I am myself a Thomist, I am a believer in a more nuanced view of pluralism.  But, I refuse to rest my laurels on epithets like Weigel.)

 

Sentence 4

Garrigou was a stalwart defender of the deductive or syllogistic style of theology and the precise vocabulary it employed, seemingly convinced that neither could be changed without grave damage being done to the truths of Catholic faith.

 Commentary

Again, first of all, my authority on this next point is infinitely more than Weigel’s, I would guess.  I believe I probably know RGL’s corpus much, much, much better than he.  I have interacted with it immensely these past 7 years of basically donated translation time.  I have had to know his various writings well and also have personally translated over one million words by Garrigou-Lagrange, let alone by others in his orbit. 

 

Garrigou favored precise vocabulary.  He was very conservative about it.  He recognized some variability in it historically, and even was well aware that in some cases it took hundreds of years to get to just the right vocabulary for defining dogmas.  (He wasn’t a “fixist” on dogmatic development.  That would be such an ignorant position.  When Weigel—or anyone else—can come and talk about the great debate between Schultes / Garrigou and Marin-Sola, then I will bother to argue with them on this point.  Until they can, then they have nothing worthwhile to say about Garrigou’s position on dogmatic development and theological vocabulary.  There are interesting questions here, and Garrigou doesn’t have all the answers.  But let the knowing argue, not those who all too quickly like to yet again repeat caricatures. ) 

 

This deserves a paragraph by itself: I think we have learned what happens when one isn’t sufficiently conservative about terminology.  One need not be an ahistorical fixist merely to have the sound insight that one should tread carefully with terminology.  Ah, grave damage was done by being too fast and loose.  And I have very Communion friendly friends who recognize this fact too.

 

Yes, Garrigou does engage in the scholastic style of argument analysis – especially in sections where he answers objections.  But he does not at all place this at the center of his writing style. When people like Weigel (or Tracey Rowland) say this, they either show that they are ignorant of his actual writings (even very scholastic ones, mind you) or are acting in bad faith for the sake of their particular party.  Let them and God discern which is the case. 

 

But, I can tell you—and boy could I cover you with citations—that Garrigou actually was making critical remarks about “merely deductive” theology.  It is SO regular on his pen that it’s almost annoying: the most important aspect of theology is understanding the great principles of each mystery and to meditate upon that.  He will say this in so many contexts.  But, guess what, unlike many today, he can explain the difference between such an argumentative structure and objectively inferential deduction.  When Weigel can explain that, then I’ll listen to what he says about “the deductive / syllogistic” style of theology.  Otherwise, let him go read more Garrigou. Then read others in the era.  And then come back and tell me if his characterization is fair or if it is merely helpful to his particular party.

 

One further point—read his _The Sense of Mystery_ and tell me if you would merely opine what Weigel says.   And if Weigel’s excuse is that he didn’t have time to read it (and I would presume a man of his stature could have long ago read it in French), then he shouldn’t mouth off about Garrigou with such false implications…. (No matter what he says about Garrigou’s interest in mysticism below, he still is slanderously wrong, retelling the same tale that basically has been in the mainstream since the 60s. Garrigou isn’t the answer to everything—sorry folks—but he’s by far not isomorphic with this sort of simplistic characterization. And, there is NO excuse for someone of Weigel’s connections and station of life not to correct his knowledge on such things. ) 

 

Sentence 5

 (To take one example: Garrigou criticized the doctoral dissertation of a young Polish priest named Karol Wojtyła because the Pole had not used the term “divine object” of God, preferring to speak of the more personal nature of the human encounter with God.)

 

Commentary

I do not know what he cites here—this quote was sent to me by a friend.  I’ve seen this claim, and I’m going to take it on its face.  The dissertation was passed.  We should know the exact sense of the concern.  If someone denies that one can ever speak of God in the technical theological terminology of object, then one will led to say some rather astounding things not merely about scholastic theology, but also even Dei Filius.  Here, I cite something by Fr. Labourdette, to be seen in full in the book I have coming out with Jon Kirwan next year:

“We are quite fine with the fact that Fr. Daniélou speaks using a different vocabulary than our own, though we still lament the fact he so clearly is anxious to enter into the vocabulary of contemporary philosophy without ourselves benefitting from the same effort at [intellectual] sympathy. However, does he not know that the notion of object, in theological language, excludes neither the “spirit of religion,” nor, as he says later on, “the sense of mystery,” (“Les orientations présentes,” 16), and that to say that our intellect has as its objects the very mysteries of faith is not only an expression of this “rationalized theology,” namely, “neo-Thomism,” but, indeed, is an expression consecrated by the solemn teaching of the [First] Vatican Council in statements which certainly have neither the intent nor the result of emptying the mystery of its meaning, even if they do not refer to Kierkegaard's categories: “The perpetual common belief of the Catholic Church has held and holds also this: there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only in its principle but also in its object; in its principle, because in the one we know by natural reason, in the other by divine faith; in its object, because apart from what natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries that are hidden in God that can never be known unless they are revealed by God” (Vatican I, Dei filius, ch. 4; Denzinger, no. 1795 [3015]).”

 

But, we can work on the assumption that everything worked out fine.  It was likely a difference of analytic styles.  But, when someone comes to you to say, “_Never ever_ use object to speak of God,” (which I can’t imagine Wojtyla saying) you better expect some incredibly loose thinking that perhaps will end with you in a rather terrible place philosophically and theologically.   The notion of “object” (which has many senses—Go read Austin Woodbury’s notes [weird as they are, they are comprehensive], George, before you act like you know what you are talking about here) is a sane philosophical notion.  And it also is a sane notion that can be (AND HAS BEEN) removed from its explicit philosophical context to be used by the Church in her teaching.

 

Aside: looking at the digital copy of the book, I see a snippet of a remark about Maritain.  The only thing involved in this case are particular questions of politics. Even here, Garrigou wanted Maritain to have an out, though Garrigou was of the opinion that certain things that were said in Maritain could risk being taken in a sense that would deserve censure.  Please, Mr. Weigel, read Philippe Chenaux’s “Maritain devant le Saint-Office: le rôle du père Garrigou-Lagrange” before remarking.

 

Sentence 7:

Garrigou also played a considerable role in the Roman critique of ressourcement theology and was thought to have been a driving force behind Pius XII’s cautionary 1950 encyclical on what the Pope deemed “false opinions threatening to undermine the foundations of Catholic doctrine,” Humani Generis, which took particular aim at the work of Henri de Lubac.

 

Commentary

Oh, this one gives me a stroke.  When Jon Kirwan’s and my book comes out, the immense ignorance of this will be manifest.  Whoever does not engage with the documents that we there present and translate will show their bad faith.  But, George, a public intellectual, should be expected to have read in detail the controversy that engaged on the one side Garrigou-Lagrange, Labourdette, and Marie-Joseph Nicolas (but also Maritain WHO AGREED WITH THEM, though privately for he was a diplomat at the time) and, on the other, Fessard, von Balthasar, Daniélou, Bouillard, De Lubac, Bruno De Solages, and Jean-Marie Le Blonde.  Has he?  Does he know the exact details of just how much of the pressure on the SJs came from within the order?  There were those who critiqued quite vigorously from within their own ranks.  He was involved in Humani Generis, though I’m not so sure that he was the penman as some have claimed.  (The use of “[principium] rationis sufficientis” is never what Garrigou says – neither in French nor in Latin.  If nothing else, you have other writers involved.). In any case, go read HG anew and ask yourself if the one reference in no. 26 really justifies saying “which took particular aim…”. And… Hmmm… Read no. 27.  As an Eastern Catholic, I would put this differently, but if one reads this aright, it’s clear what the document is arguing against…. I feel no need to imply, like WEIGEL SEEMS TO, that this papal document is problematic.  (Though Weigel might find it tedious, allow me to use syllogistic form.  Let’s concede the point about HdL, even if it deserves several levels of qualification.  [I’ll even accept HdL’s claim that his argument doesn’t put the gratuity of grace in danger.  I’m not interested in litigating that.]. I believe that the second premise that I present below is Weigel’s position.  Thus, in form: Humani generis took particular aim at HdL’s Surnaturel.  HdL’s Surnaturel wasn’t problematic (and was even vindicated by Vatican II and the Communio school later on). Therefore, HG took aim at something later held by Vatican II.  The implication?  The best could be: and therefore what it says is wrong, in light of future teaching.  But… Even HdL said he agreed with it.  So what’s the point?  If nothing else, Garrigou’s role in the whole affair is an incredibly complicated point among many other figures and concerns.

 

Sentence 8

Long interested in mysticism and the Christian call to holiness, Garrigou was not merely a theological logic-chopper.

 

Commentary

So kind a concession by Weigel.  However, as noted above, other works by Garrigou (all of them perhaps?) show that he wasn’t a “logic chopper” anywhere in his theological and philosophical works.  (Note that the latter are left out.  That makes one question George’s knowledge of the matter.)

 

Sentence 9

His identification of the ressourcement movement with Modernism was misplaced, however, and Garrigou played no significant role in the preparation of the Second Vatican Council or at the Council itself.

 

Commentary

As Jon and I definitively show in our forthcoming book, Garrigou’s claim regarding modernism was aimed at Henri Bouillard’s garbage theory of dogmatic development. Others critiqued it with more nuance and detail than Garrigou, but Garrigou wasn’t wrong.  If you read Bouillard, you can see that he should have at least have been more careful.  Garrigou himself actually said, privately, to Maritain, who visited him DURING the Nouvelle théologie controversy, that it was Bouillard who deserved condemnation but that the other “tendencies” likely couldn’t merit a full response. 

 

I don’t have enough context about the “role” he obviously didn’t play at the Council (given that he was dying a debilitating death at the time……..).  However, his thought was refracted quite powerfully in his protégé Fr. Marie-Rosaire Gagnebet, who played an important role in the preparatory documents.  Also, Garrigou’s faithful and excellent American students Fr. Joseph C. Fenton and Emmanuel Doronzo were consultators.  Others could be listed, though if we include those from throughout the council, men like Cardinal Michael Browne, Fr. Michel Labourdette, and others could be added.  (I’m sure Jon Kirwan could help me list lots of others.). And men like Sebastian Tromp (who was immensely influential) were much in line with RGL on many points.  It’s asinine to underrate the importance of the Roman Scholastics.  The final documents of the Council regularly bear witness to their concerns. I’m not saying that what Weigel said is totally wrong, but I am noting that again, this kind of simplification—presented to the general public—is just one more reiteration of a certain tired narrative.

Allow a sidebar.

People of Weigel’s generation seem to disdain the Roman Trads. And I understand their frustration. I feel that the endless critical attitude of the Trads (aimed at real problems, mind you….) has enervated their ability to engage with the intellectual tradition of the era that preceded the Council. A great example of this is the fact that when they looked to do something in moral theology, they merely republished an old manual summary by Dominic Prümmer. I don’t think Prümmer is the best (Merkelback is the best OP moral theology manualist), but if the folks involved with that Prümmer project wanted to really do something of use, they would have translated the 3 volume Prümmer. But, it seems that the genres of works that they write are so taken up with the practical liturgical battle over the Roman Rite and politics that they have slowly but surely forgotten what it is to look at all the great theologians of the Roman Church now forgotten. How many useless articles on Covid political commentary were written instead of them hunkering down and doing something with true lasting significance? Just because midwit red meat sells, that doesn’t make it morally right to do so. (The trads have critiqued modern capitalism well enough to know this too………)

But the Trads should be listened to. The Roman Church’s liturgical woes are real…. When I compare a weekly (or daily…..) Divine Liturgy to a normal Roman Catholic Sunday Mass, it is staggering the immense difference that exists between the semiotics of the two ritual forms. And when you compare the liturgical continuity that exists in the East with the immense discontinuity that does exist in the West, it takes your breath away. People (including Bishops and higher up) just bumble on and ignore this (and immediately suppress people for pointing out)… It’s staggering. If reforms of the scale as those done to the Roman Rite were foisted on the Melkite Church, boy I would love to watch—with utter support for my strong-willed Arab brethren—as they basically told Rome to pack their bags on that one, lest their very tradition itself be damaged by altering the deep structure of the liturgical patrimony. [I fear that we Ruthenians would cave… But, I would hope some of us would fight for our tradition for some time.]

I’m sure someone will accuse me of being a closet trad. Nope. I don’t like attending the TLM, though I still occasionally take my wife (who is still Roman Catholic). Not my spiritual home and not my [sui iuris] church. Not at all my spiritual-liturgical home. I attended for years as Roman Catholic before I found the Byzantine East. And it was a haven from the shipwreck that is the great majority of Roman Catholic liturgies in the US. But never my home.

But, it is insanity to me that people can’t admit in the West—without being accused of being unfaithful to Roman authority, “the Council” (and all of us who have read the documents know how the reforms definitely didn’t match what the bishops called for at the Council)—that when you change the entire liturgy of the hours, the cycle of all your Mass readings, the collects / etc. of the Mass, fabricate new Canons [not only the 3 new ones that are regularly used but all the other ones that are optional too], change your calendar significantly, practically abandon your liturgical chant tradition, etc. you immensely alter the very semiotics of the transmission of the tradition in the liturgy. (You don’t destroy it. But it is insanity to act as though the liturgical transmission of the tradition wouldn’t be affected by such widescale changes, eliminations, creations, etc.) I know, I know… “the Pope has the authority to do this”. But, I would ask the important quesiton: is such authority here exercised legitimately? For the good of the Church one—especially private persons—must not rise up publicly against the Pope when something is done unjustly. (And this is the same kind of thing that holds for all communities. One should generally respect authority. Not because authority is always right. But because the common good presumes filial piety in one’s criticism of authority. Open revolution is only very rarely justified.) But, at the time in the 1960s / 70s, too many were ready for the space age and also were conditioned to never register questions about ecclesiastical authority. Thus, they just accepted the changes. (I remember stories about an old curmudgeonly conservative priest at the Roman Catholic parish where I grew up as a child. He disliked the changes but was a “company man”, a classmate of the bishop. Imagine if the “company men” objected to the wholesale changes to the Roman Rite… How different your form would have been.)

And, I assure you, I have no desire to go back to the Roman Rite in whatever form. I have found my spiritual home. But I am noting that these kinds of concerns by the trads are not wrong. They drive me insane with their midwit commentary and—excuse the uncouth son of Appalachia—bitching and moaning online. I expect more of them, but their broad culture is a constant disappointment to me. There are many very good people among their numbers who are just trying to find a sane ecclesial home. But, I refuse to be silent about my opinion that they seem to just be marking time in rage, awaiting the metaphysically impossible return of the past into the present, basically talking the same narrative as what they set years ago when their general “movement” started. For example, with the anniversary of Vatican II, we’ll hear about whom? Lefebvre and Ottaviani…… Maybe a few well worn others. But it will be mostly rinse and repeat. Imagine, though, if someone wrote a long article on the role of Gagnebet at the Council. Or Tromp. Or Parente. Or Browne. Or Doronzo. Or even Fenton. I personally think also men like Journet, though I know that trads hate him because of his political positions.

(Let me make an observation, though. I have done a bit of interacting with the folks at Arouca Press. Sometimes, they publish very trad-normal books. But, their founder also tries to publish other texts of greater merit to expand the patrimony of the Trads. I think that this is very admirable. In fact, they are publishing Fenton’s Council diaries and are publishing Doronzo’s excellent texts. And they commission new translations. I want to note this as a signal case of what trads should be doing. There are other examples, no doubt. But, how much repetition of the same old things… with some spiced up Viganoism…!)

But, what is more, the schizophrenia of “pre” and “post” conciliarism, which exists in Weigel’s implicitly victorious-Communio narrative, needs overcoming. To merely tap into the “preconciliar” world by looking solely at the Communio folks is not enough (and snidely commenting about the “preconciliar neo-Thomists”). I’m sorry Bishop Barron. I’m sorry George Weigel. I’m sorry so many of a certain generation. Notice very well that I’m not looking to toss the Communio folks overboard. There has been immense diversity theologically even merely in the West, let alone in the Universal Church, through the ages. I’m very (VERY—to the point of tedium) aware of the weakness of my own dear Garrigou. But… While I can admit that, why is it that one cannot admit the weaknesses of their side? Why is it that only one side must always concede it was wrong? Why is it that a certain kind of conservative refuses to admit that perhaps there is a bigger tale?—As though that would immediately concede ground that the theological progressives would abuse.

Some trads are saying that we need to just put the Council behind us. I’m noticing from conservatives a kind of narrative that says, “Those problems were from the past. We need to fight the foe today.” I think both are wrong. As an Eastern Catholic, I see the great good of the Council. It hasn’t always been easy for us either, but our experience is very different from that of the West. But, those who want Thomists like me to stop fighing over the crisis that preceded the Council are  wrong. It is immensely important to understand the effects of the Nouvelle théologie crisis—and the truth of it, not merely a narrative that so simplifies the concerns of faithful theologians.

Sentence 10

Nonetheless, a post-conciliar Church would eventually find use for the finely honed distinctions of the Neo-Scholasticism he embodied, although it was some thirty years after his death in 1964.

 

Commentary

It seems that Weigel is here noting the way that certain OPs during JP II’s era exercised influence. That being said, it is not clear how much this thin praise is meant to wash back over Garrigou himself. The selection is taken from a larger section devoted to various figures. (The hit parade, including the selection on Maritain and even Gilson, are such simplifications… The Maritain one, in particular, where one speaks of his Thomist existentialism is an example of how people of Weigel’s call Maritain and “existential Thomist”—but I could write an entire screed on how that’s the wrong way to think of Maritain. But, it seems that instead of reading all of Maritain’s works in detail, one would rather rest upon the laurels of lazy repetition of summaries from one’s youth….)

One quote at a time....

I am going to put this into the file of "many things are half-truths at best."  Many Catholics think that the following thought waited for centuries to come from the pen of Fr. Servais Pinckaers, O.P.  While Fr. Pinckaers certainly did accomplish some things, one would do well to note how much he may have learned when he was at the Angelicum and had Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange as a teacher.  I tire (TIRE) of the agenda that even well-meaning Catholics push by acting like nothing at all ever existed before Vatican II, except what happens to fit their little pet projects.  I am well aware (well) of the weaknesses of Roman Thomism; however, a weakness doesn't need to mean a "fault"; and, let us all be honest - those with eyes that are even mildly open can see the many weaknesses of these past decades, many, many.

This is taken from Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “La prudence: sa place dans l’organisme des vertus,” Revue thomiste 31 (1926): 411-426.

            By this, one sees the usefulness that there is in treating moral theology, not only form the point of view of casuistry, a kind of contestable intermediary between moral science and prudence, but from a metaphysical point of view that permits one to determine the nature of each virtue according to its formal object, to deduce their properties and their relations with the other superior and inferior virtues.  Thus does one see the place of each one in the spiritual edifice, and it is why St. Thomas divided the moral part of his Summa according to the division and the hierarchy of the virtues and not according to the division of the precepts, for these latter are often negative thus they look more directly upon vices to combat than upon virtues to practice.

            Thus has been shown in the most profound manner all that which is contained in the Aristotelian definition of prudence: recta ratio agibilium, chow this definition ought to be applied in the supernatural order to infused prudence, and why this, remaining discursive and sometimes hesitating, needs, above all in difficult circumstances, to be aided by the special inspirations of the gift of counsel.[1]

 

[1] See ST II-II q.52 a.2.