Equality or Unity? (i.e. "Sweetness" or Light?)

More would be accomplished if we spoke about complex matters in terms of kinds of unity than in the simplistic vocabulary of equality.  The latter is rather anemic, no?  Faced with the facts of experience and reality, it really just leaves us on the formless sea of power claims.  Shout as we will at one another, arguments that appeal equality are not really going to get us very far—at least outside of mathematics (and a mathematicised pseudo-ontology).

Just as a matter of clarifying discourse, I have thought of writing an article calling out the sophistical use of equals signs in political debates.  Equality and sameness are not, well, the same(!)—though they can appear to be so.  Aristotle was wiser than not when he noted that equality pertains primarily to quantities.  Quantities are equal or unequal, qualities are more or less similar or dissimilar. 

However, when we enter the conceptual register of being and what things are, well then… Things can be one and the same either: individually (as a person is one), in genus (as man and dog are one in being animals or as playing baseball and playing football are one in being recreational activities), in species, or one by analogy (the thorniest issue of all).  Indeed, as we will see below (in a mere sketch) it is even much more complex than this.

To talk about things like, oh, marriage in terms of = and ≠ really impoverishes the discourse.  (Surprise, surprise in the day of twitter-attention-spans and Facebook posts.  Or, surprise-surprise again in the era that follows from the modern renunciation of all things past—let us forget the long conquest undertaken by the intellect.  We do not need intellectual virtue, we only need technique and method!)  I say instead, “Good sir, define X and Y through genus and specific difference (at least in a vague manner).  What kind of unity do they have?”  Being able to answer that question would likely add a good deal of intelligence to conversations that are, generally speaking, nothing more than irrational emoting (covering this with much sophistry, as sophistry is wont to do).

Equality just doesn’t “cash out” like unity.  Surprise, surprise that it doesn’t.  Equality pertains only to quantity, while unity transcends and applies to every mode of being.  But, whoops, there we go again.  Our poor little modern minds like to reduce all things to quantity (and then fill in all other spaces with the “quality” of our utterly blind emotions).  A bit of formal causality (outside of quantity) goes a long way.

End note: Of course, unity indicates lack of division, which can be said in many ways, more than we have indicated here.  Following two sets of notes on Ostensive Metaphysics (as opposed to Critique or Critical Metaphysics) by Fr. Austin Woodberry (cf. John Deely and Anthony Russell Collection at St. Vincent College, p.169 and 659; edition dating unclear), unity should be divided as follows:

·      Transcendental Unity

o   Unity of Simplicity

o   Unity of Composition

§  Unity Per se

§  Unity Per accidens

·      By juxtaposition (Aggregational unity)

·      By extrinsic causality

o   Effectively

o   Finally

·      By information (or, inherential unity)

o   As accident inheres in substance

o   As accident inheres in accident

·      Non-Transcendental unity

o   Unity of reason (rationis; Woodbury: “thoughty unity”)

§  Generic

§  Specific

o   Real

§  Formal

·      Considered on the score of predicates

o   Generic

o   Specific

·      Considered on the score of termination

o   Ultimately Terminated

o   Not-Ultimately Terminated

§  Material or Numeric

·      Substantial

·      Accidental

o   According to individuation from subject

o   According to individuation of quantity through itself, which is predicamental unity

I won’t here list out the details of the outline.  I merely want to note it as a sign that the scholastic vocabulary is far richer at making razor sharp distinctions—far more than the ham-handed equality that is all remaining to the geometricizing intellect of contemporary man.

And of course, given that sameness is nothing other than agreement following upon unity, we must know what kind of unity we are speaking of before we can even begin to argue about sameness.

Or, we can just stamp our feet and talk about equality without any acknowledgment of formal causality whatsoever.  But, when we refuse to say that anything is what it is, we have left the world of rational discourse completely.  That will end nowhere good, I assure you.  Read Pieper’s insightful reflections on the matter, Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power.

A priori and a posteriori—A frustration

When we come to the other side, I suspect that we will see how much has NOT been taught well.  I suspect that much would be gained in discussions of the "A priori" and "A posteriori" if we take seriously that these terms represent the way that scholastic vocabulary developed in commenting on propter quid and quia demonstrations.  Indeed, it is clear that early uses of the vocabulary were afoot in texts like Aquinas's commentary on the Posterior Analytics.  One will find it in later scholastics as well (cf. the ol' Logic Museum on a passage from Bill of Ockham's Summa logicae).  I'm sure that one finds it in the curriculum used by Kant before his so-called "Copernican Revolution." 

I hate to be so negative, but it is a grave disservice (even to beginners in philosophy) to ignore these sorts of historical points—especially given the richness of the building blocks one gets from an Aristotelian perspective.  Indeed, given that Aristotle stands behind so much of Western thought (even when he is rejected), it is a mark of unbecoming ignorance to wish to overlook the terminological links to the Stagirite and those who carried his work back into the existential situation of Europe from the Middle Ages on. 

Just as much, it is part of the general tribal myth that is propagated by modernity, ever presenting itself as though it sprung from the brow of some thinker or some movement.  Never look behind such matters!  No, no!  To do so will threaten the myths that many have crafted—myths that can be just as dangerous and deceptive as anything primitive.  Indeed, I suspect that even though mixed with many negative elements, primitive man made his myths with some fear and trembling before something numinous and greater than himself.  Alas, modernity (let alone so-called post-modernity) makes its myths so as to avoid any fear and trembling of this kind—let all things be made to man's measure alone!

Okay, I will stop venting my frustrations....  Still, go over to Wikipedia to see one kind of example of historical ignorance.  Then, take a look at this post on Stanford to see a tour de force of academic "erudition" in typical Anglophonic fashion.  See the Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy for similarly frustrating ruminations.

For now, see the remarks of Eduoard Hugon.  I don't have time give a full translation of what is below.  However, see the important bolded remarks below.  They are, roughly:

Demonstration a priori does not coincide with demonstration propter quid, nor does demonstration a posteriori coincide with demonstration quia.  Demonstration a priori proceeds through causes of any sort, whether proximate or remote; however, demonstration propter quid . . . through proper, immediate, and adequate causes.  Hence, every demonstration propter quid is a priori; however, not every demonstration a priori is propter quid.

Demonstration a posteriori is only through an effect; however, demonstration quia is through an effect or through remote causes.  Therefore, every a posteriori demonstration is quia, while it is not the case that every quia demonstration is a posteriori.

(The justification for reading "or" for "et" can be based upon remarks on p.383:) Demonstration quia, taking the particle 'quia' not as causal (i.e. meaning "because") but as it means 'that the thing is', proceeds either through a sign and effect or through remote, common, and inadequate causes.

Éduoard Hugon, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticae, Vol. 1, Logica (Paris: Lethielleux, 1927).

From page 384: Demonstratio a priori est quae rem ostendit per causam ; a posteriori quae causam colligit per effectum. Unde in demonstratione a priori prœmissae sunt propositiones notiores quoad se , in demonstratione autem a posteriori pnemissae sunt notiores quoad nos, non quoad se, et hinc apparet demonstrationem a posteriori esse imperfectam.  Demonstratio a priori non coincidit cum demonstratione propter quid, nec demonstratio a posteriori cum demonstratione quia.

Demonstratio enim a priori procedit per causas quascumque sive proximas, sive remotas; demonstratio autem propter quid, ut jam novimus, per causas proprias, immediatas, adaequatas. Hinc omnis demonstratio propter quid est a priori, non tamen omnis demonstratio a priori est propter quid. 

Demonstratio a posteriori est solum per effectus, demonstratio autem quia est per effectus et per causas remotas. Omnis ergo demonstratio a posteriori est quia, at non omnis demonstratio quia est a posteriori.

From page 383: Demonstratio quia, sumpta particula quia, non ut est causalis, sed ut significat quod res est, procedit vel per signa et effectus, vel per causas remotas, communes, inadaequatas.

On the Value of Scientific Theories

I came across this in the notes and papers of Anthony Russell from his time in Australia studying under Fr. Austin Woodbury, SM.  Reading through Woodbury's papers, it is clear that he takes the general lines of his approach to these matters from the same school of thought that includes Jacques Maritain and Yves Simon.  It differs from the Laval School a good bit.  The whole matter comes down to the nature of defining middle terms used in the particular sciences.  One needs to understand well the precisions made by Cajetan regarding formal objects of science when he undertakes his discussions at the beginning of the Summa theologiae.  It is very important to be clear about the nature of the distinction between—thing, the intellectual objectification of the thing known, considered from the perspective of the thing known (ratio formalis obiecti ut res), and the intellectual objectification of the thing known, considered from the perspective of the object as such (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiecti).  This last is most specificative of a science as a science.   However, more on that in another post.  Look for tags like Woodbury, Thing and Object, Scientific Knowability, etc.

For now, I am going to transcribe an addendum after pg. 360 of Fr. Woodbury's Logic text.  This excerpt comes from the collection of Anthony Russell, housed at St. Vincent College in Latrobe, PA:

"Logic Lecture, November 21st 1956 [or, 1950], continued...

"Here the question is about those super hypotheses of the sciences (such as The Kinetic Theory of Gasses; the Einstein[ian] Theory of Relativity).  The question is: What Ontological Value have these theories got?  Or [, in other words,] what is their value as statements of reality"?

"Outside of the Thomistic School, two opinions have been held: [Read these as examples of formally extreme positions, not the only materially possible positions one might have...]

"a. [The view] prevalent among [s]cientific [t]heorists till about mid, or late, last century [i.e. the 19th century], who maintained that they state reality as it is.  Thus, Lord Kelvin: "With a laboratory big enough, I could make a world, like God."

This opinion says these theories have formally ontological value, i.e. state reality as it is; state reality and in a real manner; not just conceptualized reality, but the very mode of conceptualization of the reality is real too.

"b. Against [this aforementioned position, there] occurred a powerful reaction toward the end of last century, from idealists, from Wundt, and from the apostates from positivism.  They stated that these theories have got no ontological value at all.  So, the success of Einstein's Theory in the atomic destruction of Hiroshima, and Shift in the Perihelion of Mercury, and bending of light rays at Sun's limb, were all flukes on this opinion.  They don't state reality at all.  Edding[ton] goes that far in his The Nature of the Physical World.

"Opposed to both these extremes, the Thomistic Doctrine is that these theories (a) state reality but (b) in an unreal (metaphorical) manner.  So, they have real value as regards what is stated but not as regards the manner of statement.

"[The following reworks the text because of formatting oddities.  To summarize the point, then, we can say the following.  In speaking of the ontological value or scientific theories, they are, materially or fundamentally speaking, real being, but formally speaking, mental being. (By the latter, Woodbury almost certainly means ens rationis or, perhaps even more so, ens rationis and beings having a condition of reason, as happens with regard to mathematical notions.  On this, one should consult the related discussions on entia rationis in Maritian's Degrees of Knowledge.)  That is, they are metaphors, stating reality but in an unreal manner.  Their community with the real is a community of metaphoric proportionality.]

"When you say, 'The lion is King of the Jungle,' do you state reality or not?  Yes, but not in a real manner.  What is state is real but the form in which it is stated, or proposed, is not real.   That naming of the lion as 'king' . . . is not an attribution of regal authority or power of jurisdiction over others . . . but is made because the lion produces effects like a king over subjects (as [too in the case of] governments with regard to our incomes).  You have expressed reality but the form according to which you express it is not real. That is, between what you say and the reality is analogy of metaphoric proportionality.  If you keep in mind, "The lion is the king of the jungle," you will come safely across Africa.  If you forget, you probably won't.  It is sufficient to account for the success of your voyage across Africa, so it is not a fluke that you cake out; you came out in virtue of the fundamental or material ontological value of the proposition.    Thus, is the Einsteinian Theory successful, on account of its ontological mateiral value, not on account of its formal value.

"That is all the scientific theories can get in ontological value (because of their peri-noetic [cf. Maritain] manner of conceiving).  It is precisely on account of their empiriological manner of knowing([i.e.] can't know natures in themselves—[that we are constrained] to know them in empiriological signs) that these theories are not real but [instead are] mental in their mode of conceiving.  A property of empiriological science is that its concepts are mental beings [entia rationis] founded in the real [i.e. in reality].  It is a block of reality (i.e. a nature) which is conceived, but the mannerof conceiving it is unreal (not conceived as it is in itself because [we] can't know it in itself).  [Here, one needs to revisit carefully the capabilities and limitations of the human intellect with regard to knowledge of the quiddities of substances.]

"[Again, slightly altered: We must distinguish (1) what is stated or conceived and (2) the manner of stating or conceiving it.  So too, in scientific theory, we must distinguish (1) what is proposed is true (i.e. in accord with reality) and (2) the manner it is proposed is not true (i.e. not in accord with reality).]

"This unreal manner of conceiving is necessary on account of the very imperfection of the empiriological manner of conceiving itself.

Trying to Explain Sophistry

Frankfurt, Harry G.  On Bullshit.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Frankfurt, Harry G.  On Truth.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008.

I teach in an interesting little night school program for Mount St. Mary's University.  All of my students are non-majors and, indeed, very practically minded in their education goals.  Nonetheless, they need to take nine credits of philosophy!  Bravo to the Mount for this, I say.

Any introduction to philosophy class needs to be a kind of apologia for philosophy as such.  I use some thematic devices throughout our readings (pretty standard stuff for an introduction) to help them to see how sophistry and philosophy can look like each other.  I try to help them to differentiate them.  I think old Aristotle was keen to note the look-alike between the sophist and the metaphysician.  Of course, he had a great teacher who knew the truth.

I had been considering using some selections from Pieper, but I gladly decided to read Frankfurt's texts.  I was impressed by his little book On Inequality.  It's not a massive treatise, of course.  However, it was just a balanced little bit of sane philosophy—very carefully and genially reasoned through on a thorny topic.  Yes, the systematician in me wanted more, but I really had respect for him after reading it.  Any man who truly goes into the struggle with an object of knowledge is so refreshing in this day of articles on popular topics....

His On Bullshit and (even more so) On Truth really impressed me as well.  I plan to use On Truth to help my students further process some of the themes that we take from the more "classical canon" of philosophers.  Of course, I feel badly for Dr. Frankfurt as well.... I suspect that he is a somewhat lonely voice in his corner of academia, which tends to worship sophistry I would argue.  However, he is a philosopher, I think.  I suspect he would be quite surprised to hear that a hardliner Thomist says this...  In any case, Bravo, good sir!

Contemplating a Coup

Mitchell, Peter M.  The Coup at Catholic University: The 1968 Revolution in American Catholic Education.  San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2015.

A good little text on the whole.  It does fail to play out the nation-wide dynamics a bit.  Also, the back-cover review that states that "rigidity" was partially to blame for the overreaction is really only partial.  Myself frustrated with the low intellectual quality of the training (and writing / preaching) of many priests and bishops, I think that it's important to notice that Mitchell also pays heed to the practical bent of the bishops during these days.  They were "brick and mortar" men.  I suspect that they did not themselves suspect the depths to which things would sink.  Many of them backed down too quickly, and too few of them marshaled the intellectual profundity needed to respond to the rebels of the day.  Alas.  I have been reading notes from the somewhat obscure (but wildly inspiring) Fr. Austin Woodbury, SM.  Men like him show well that theology and philosophy in the 50s-60s could be incredibly rich and technical.  I suspect that there was just a lot of mediocrity here in the US, surprise surprise.  We are not a contemplative people.  (And let us note that mediocrity can come in the form of academic activism as well - publish, publish, publish....)

I do feel a little bad for Curran.  Mitchell does do his best to be balanced.  However, it is hard for him not to come off as a brash young man.  Once again, knowing that theology should end on one's knees, and that the light of virtual revelation (i.e. the light of theology) itself demands to give way not only to formal revelation (i.e. faith) but above all to the savoring of Divine Things by the Spirit's gift of wisdom, I find it truly sad that Curran's theology was so "earthy", when theology is above all about heavenly things.

It also should tell us something about the Roman Universities where he was trained....

Also, I think that a history should be written about the saintly Jude Dougherty, who led the school of philosophy through the hard days.  But, someone else will have to do that, it seems.

A Particular Kind of Asceticism

I had a lovely discussion with a colleague earlier this week.  He and I have slightly different approaches to philosophy, and it gave me pause to think a moment about the dynamics often at play for a Catholic philosopher.  Distinct disciplines have a hard time staying distinct in the soul of a thinker—who is one person, leading a life directed to his or her final end.

It takes a kind of asceticism to be a Catholic Philosopher.  It is so tempting to become involved in theological mattes.  These are lofty truths.  They are the sorts of things upon which the intellect feeds, rejoices, and then desires the greatest of all things—Vision of God Himself.

As a Thomist, it is sometimes even worse, I feel.  So many of our thinkers were theologians.  Furthermore, Thomist theology represents a singular instance of how philosophical reasoning can be deployed as an instrument in a higher discipline.  Gracious me, in theology, we find philosophy singing and vibrating with the chords of celestial realities.

But that higher light, the light of virtual revelation as the Thomists of yore would say, is not the light of reason itself.  It is reason as instrumentally used by the supernatural habitus of faith so as to draw out, in a scientific manner, the conclusions contained in the sacred deposit grasped under the light of formal revelation.  Reason shines—but with a light that is not its own, a light the elevates it, showing just how lofty reason itself is.  It is inspiring—and it does indeed show us the many things that can fall to philosophical rumination.

Philosophy is a bit like a dim room.  You can put things in order pretty well, but every so often, the sun outside of the room shines into it.  You realize that there is so much more to do with the room, so you move around and fix it up a bit.  However, in the evening, as the sun sets, you once again realize how little you can see.  If someone asked, "How did you do that," and that person knew not of the sun, you would not be able to explain it well.  It would be a lot harder to come up with a procedure that would work only in the dim candle light of the dim room.

Ah, so much more can be said.  Still, one more anecdote, and I will be done.  I have been reflecting of late on practical signs.  Our experience is perfused with them—PERFUSED.  And the Thomist account of signs and of relatio secundum esse, "essential relation" or "relation according to the manner that relation uniquely has being," gives a rich vocabulary for discussing such things.  John Deely is quite right that we are semiotic animals, though he doesn't meditate at length on artistic and moral being.  Alas.  But think around my desk alone—a cup is a sign of drinking, my books are signs of work to be done (in addition to the speculative role they play in being signs of thoughts about various topics), the picture of my wife and I is at once a speculative sign of an event to be remembered and an act of affection that I morally ought to have every so often.  Trust me for now—signs are everywhere.  We bathe in an ocean of them, an ocean.

Well the best writing on practical signs is probably found in the Dominican tradition stemming from the remarks that John of St. Thomas makes on... the Sacraments.  Alas, typical Thomists only get to these things in theology—and they do so well.  However, I am charged as a philosopher with doing some theological reasoning.  I must understand these arguments on their own terms—within a hermeneutic that includes the light of faith explicitly.  What is more, when I leave them, I must always remember that there are certain things that I cannot say.  For example, I cannot succumb to the temptation of saying with (sadly disgraced) Jesuit Cardinal Billot that there is a kind of "intentional causality" involved in sacramental signs.  That is, I must strongly realize the fact that signs never (even practical ones) never, never are efficient causes.  It seems simple, but the ramifications are dire!

So, we go on, though.  Stepping out of the lofty heights of the sacraments back down to the light of philosophy....  Let us pray that I do not sin against either light!