Vexation aimed aroused by Weigel.....

I have updated this slightly, in the hopes of taking out some of my sauce directed at George Weigel. He has striven, of course, through his long life to be a faithful son of the Church. And, if I were in a different mood, and he were attacked by the Trads, I would all the studden start defending him with this much spice. But, I nonetheless am disappointed with his characterizations of Garrigou-Lagrange… Thus, what I say stands. Few will read it anyway… I merely wanted to respond to an interlocutor online. It spilled over into immense vexation. Remember, most of this is stream of consciousness…. And not much edited.

I lost my patience today regarding something the recent text by George Weigel related to the anniversary of Vatican II. It was mostly because of its ignorant half truth (=lies) about Garrigou-Lagrange. I get a bit testy. Oh well. It doesn’t really matter, but here it is for the record. It’s all so funny. I am actually a pluralist who will defend Eastern prerogatives. But, I am also a Thomist and know way too much about Garrigou’s history and work not to be angered that the ol’ Grandee of the Pope St. John Paul era finds it necessary to continue propagating these things. I actually want Communio people and even very conservative Thomists to get along. But I cannot accept this kind of thing without at least saying something.

These remarks are totally off the cuff on a day when I really had no time to do it… No editing, just raw Appalachian Thomist Ranting.

The full quote, which was sent to me (which I then looked at in its immediate context):

Thomas’s theology, Chenu argued, ought not be reduced to a closed system in theological manuals. If the Church reappropriated the Christ-centered, sacramental, and contemplative or mystical elements of Thomas’s thought and spirituality, settled truths could be presented in a fresh light that was more suitable for proclaiming Christ and Christian truth to modern skeptics. [fn. 33] The Neo-Scholastic Thomistic thought that dominated Roman theology from the Modernist crisis to the Second Vatican Council was exemplified by Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP: the “Sacred Monster of Thomism,” as he was dubbed. Garrigou was a stalwart defender of the deductive or syllogistic style of theology and the precise vocabulary it employed, seemingly convinced that neither could be changed without grave damage being done to the truths of Catholic faith. (To take one example: Garrigou criticized the doctoral dissertation of a young Polish priest named Karol Wojtyła because the Pole had not used the term “divine object” of God, preferring to speak of the more personal nature of the human encounter with God. [fn. 34]) Garrigou also played a considerable role in the Roman critique of ressourcement theology and was thought to have been a driving force behind Pius XII’s cautionary 1950 encyclical on what the Pope deemed “false opinions threatening to undermine the foundations of Catholic doctrine,” Humani Generis, which took particular aim at the work of Henri de Lubac. Long interested in mysticism and the Christian call to holiness, Garrigou was not merely a theological logic-chopper. His identification of the ressourcement movement with Modernism was misplaced, however, and Garrigou played no significant role in the preparation of the Second Vatican Council or at the Council itself. Nonetheless, a post-conciliar Church would eventually find use for the finely honed distinctions of the Neo-Scholasticism he embodied, although it was some thirty years after his death in 1964.[fn. 35] ”

Sentence 1

Thomas’s theology, Chenu argued, ought not be reduced to a closed system in theological manuals.

 

Commentary

Setting aside concerns regarding Chenu, who is a mixed bag—though, it should be remembered: (a) Garrigou had wanted Chenu to be his successor at the Angelicum; (b) that when the whole affair at the Saulchoir broke down in the late 1930s / early 1940s, from what I understand Garrigou tried to be moderate.  What is more, on the latter point, he wasn’t alone in his concerns—merely note Pietro Parente’s own remarks about Chenu, but also the closely related articles by Marie Rosaire Gagnebet. Not unrelated, too, were similar concerns by Charles Boyer, SJ.  (But the latter two were also arguing against other authors too.). I’m willing to be disabused of this claim that Garrigou was not uncharitable toward Chenu in the affair at the Saulchoir—though such disabusing must be based upon documentary evidence, not Fr. Chenu’s later bickering to people like Gilson.

 

Moreover, the genre of “manual” is slippery.  And this slipperiness is used as a cudgel.  There are multiple genres that were written by Latin theologians:

Manuals: Textbooks for seminary formation, often arranged in a very summary thesis / proof format.  Garrigou regularly would critique this significant weakness of manuals.  See here for where I have gathered a florilegium of his remarks to this end:

https://www.philosophicalcatholic.com/quotations/2022/10/12/florilegium-of-garrigou-quotes-on-the-manuals

 

Theological treatises (Tractatus de…): Generally broken up like the treatises in St. Thomas’s Summa, or perhaps something modeled on later Latin scholastic breakouts of theological topics.  These would sometimes share aspects of the manual style.  Nonetheless, they represented quasi-monographs in scholastic style, dealing with a given topic.  Franzelin was not a Thomist, but think of his works.  Or, think of Billot, again not really a Thomist, but yet again scholastic monographs, not teaching manuals.  Or, think of Emmanuel Dorozo’s 11,000 pages on the sacraments—recognized WIDELY for their mastery, even by those who disagreed with him on points.  They were Latin Catholic theological monographs.  What is more, even things like Doronzo’s “manual” set on dogmatics (which was unfinished) is like a truly MA / PhD level textbook.  If such things exist for medical school, why not for theology?

 

Commentaries: Many of Garrigou’s works are actually more like shorter-form commentaries, not manuals.  Fr.  John Saward once said this to me (positively, as he had by that point undergone his theological transition), and it totally opened up what it was that RGL (and others too) were doing in text like this.  It seems like splitting a hair, but it’s not unimportant to distinguish genres.

 

Thus, the term “manual” is thus used as cudgel to daze those who don’t dare look further into things but, instead rest upon the authority of someone like Chenu, so as to tell oneself that all was dark in an age before.  It’s far more complicated.  (Also, as an aside, there is a true and real sense in which one can call the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas a manual.  As I age, I see the weakness of certain structural points in the ST (and yet also see other aspects to its particular grandeur, which is so very much that of its own author’s mind).  But I think it would be insanity—especially for Latin Catholics—to throw away the ST just because it was a quasi-manual.

 

There was, yes, a tendency of Latin Scholastics to talk among themselves in their neat little bubble.  And this tended to make Thomism feel closed up.  And yet, read Marie Michel Labourdette’s response to this kind of claim by the SJs he was dialoguing with during the Nouvelle Théologie crisis, and you’ll see that he and the Toulouse OPs didn’t think of Thomism as closed.  As for Garrigou, it’s a mixed bag—he’s an older Thomist, yes.  And yet, if you pay heed to him—and here, sir, I’ll venture that I’ve read more of him than Weigel—you see all sorts of ways in which he was an open-minded thinker.  (A huge amount of Maritain is Garrigouvian, even into the former’s old age.)  Just because petulant young men in the 30s-50s were frustrated with that old man—as I am now (not so young anymore) frustrated with Weigel—doesn’t make their frustrations COMPLETELY correct.  Imagine if I called Weigel (WHICH I HAVEN’T): Overly-optimistic boomer Catholic on the dole of the mainstream and totally detached from the actual state of things, claiming a springtime when we live in the dying days of fall for this season of history.  Boy oh boy do I want to say that about him (which many in my generation do), but I actually think it would too simplistic.  I would ask only the same level of reservation regarding those who came before Chenu, the latter of whom was himself also human and given to licking his wounds with nasty invective.  

 

 

Sentence 2

If the Church reappropriated the Christ-centered, sacramental, and contemplative or mystical elements of Thomas’s thought and spirituality, settled truths could be presented in a fresh light that was more suitable for proclaiming Christ and Christian truth to modern skeptics.

 

Commentary

“Reappropriated” these elements.  So sad that they were lost.  Garrigou’s generation—and that of Gardeil, whom Chenu and Congar appropriated to themselves unjustly, unless they want to admit that they should recognize how much they owed to Garrigou (Congar even owed his OP vocation to Garrigou’s preaching)—was already well into the renewal of moral and spiritual theology which involved all the “reappropriations” spoken of by Weigel.  Everyone thinks of Pinckaers on the question of Moral Theology.  And yet, I have shown in various articles, that you find all of this a generation earlier.  In a sense, Fr. Pinckaers is rather unimpressive in comparison – nothing new but only felicitously easier narrative approaches to the same content.  But, consider Marmion’s immensely profitable theology of life in Christ.  Very early in the 3 Ages, Garrigou recognizes and recommends this as of immense profit to one’s understanding of the spiritual life.  Moreover, the contemplative / mystical life was at the center of Garrigou’s many fights in spiritual theology.

 

What is more, Garrigou wrote for his age against the skeptics of his age.  This is clear in his more philosophical works.  That he wasn’t writing as Chenu wanted in the 1930s-50s is a sidelight.  Garrigou did not fight such engagement.  (More later when I respond to Larry Chapp.) Many “neo-Thomists” (more on this term to Larry below) engaged precisely in this.  It is WAY too variegated a world just to act as though they did not.  There were many other “conservative Thomists” whom Chenu didn’t like either, though they too were involved more than mere repetition of little lisping words out of manuals in ecclesiastical Latin (as Chenu—and Weigel implicitly through him) makes them out to be.

 

On the sacraments and the liturgy, yep, they were often weak, but even here, someone like Marmion shows a real engagement with the liturgical movement (and stout defense sometimes against wrongheaded SJ criticisms of the OSBs on this score).

 

Sentence 3

 The Neo-Scholastic Thomistic thought that dominated Roman theology from the Modernist crisis to the Second Vatican Council was exemplified by Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP: the “Sacred Monster of Thomism,” as he was dubbed.

 

Commentary

The dubbing first.  This was François Mauriac, and it was not some kind of universally held titling of Garrigou.  Many, especially the younger, didn’t like him (though…. he also had many loving younger students, as you will see if you read the _Angelicum_ in memoriam remembrances of him).  But the use of this title by Weigel is rhetorical garbage unless it is qualified. 

 

Also, more on “Neo-scholastic Thomistic” thought later to Larry.  First of all… there were still great Suarezians during that period, even if less so than in earlier days.  Moreover, there were many sorts of Thomism, not all as Neo as others.  But more on that to Larry below.

 

(And, to be clear, I personally don’t like the kind of Thomism-über-Alles attitude of the age.  As a Ruthenian Catholic, even though I am myself a Thomist, I am a believer in a more nuanced view of pluralism.  But, I refuse to rest my laurels on epithets like Weigel.)

 

Sentence 4

Garrigou was a stalwart defender of the deductive or syllogistic style of theology and the precise vocabulary it employed, seemingly convinced that neither could be changed without grave damage being done to the truths of Catholic faith.

 Commentary

Again, first of all, my authority on this next point is infinitely more than Weigel’s, I would guess.  I believe I probably know RGL’s corpus much, much, much better than he.  I have interacted with it immensely these past 7 years of basically donated translation time.  I have had to know his various writings well and also have personally translated over one million words by Garrigou-Lagrange, let alone by others in his orbit. 

 

Garrigou favored precise vocabulary.  He was very conservative about it.  He recognized some variability in it historically, and even was well aware that in some cases it took hundreds of years to get to just the right vocabulary for defining dogmas.  (He wasn’t a “fixist” on dogmatic development.  That would be such an ignorant position.  When Weigel—or anyone else—can come and talk about the great debate between Schultes / Garrigou and Marin-Sola, then I will bother to argue with them on this point.  Until they can, then they have nothing worthwhile to say about Garrigou’s position on dogmatic development and theological vocabulary.  There are interesting questions here, and Garrigou doesn’t have all the answers.  But let the knowing argue, not those who all too quickly like to yet again repeat caricatures. ) 

 

This deserves a paragraph by itself: I think we have learned what happens when one isn’t sufficiently conservative about terminology.  One need not be an ahistorical fixist merely to have the sound insight that one should tread carefully with terminology.  Ah, grave damage was done by being too fast and loose.  And I have very Communion friendly friends who recognize this fact too.

 

Yes, Garrigou does engage in the scholastic style of argument analysis – especially in sections where he answers objections.  But he does not at all place this at the center of his writing style. When people like Weigel (or Tracey Rowland) say this, they either show that they are ignorant of his actual writings (even very scholastic ones, mind you) or are acting in bad faith for the sake of their particular party.  Let them and God discern which is the case. 

 

But, I can tell you—and boy could I cover you with citations—that Garrigou actually was making critical remarks about “merely deductive” theology.  It is SO regular on his pen that it’s almost annoying: the most important aspect of theology is understanding the great principles of each mystery and to meditate upon that.  He will say this in so many contexts.  But, guess what, unlike many today, he can explain the difference between such an argumentative structure and objectively inferential deduction.  When Weigel can explain that, then I’ll listen to what he says about “the deductive / syllogistic” style of theology.  Otherwise, let him go read more Garrigou. Then read others in the era.  And then come back and tell me if his characterization is fair or if it is merely helpful to his particular party.

 

One further point—read his _The Sense of Mystery_ and tell me if you would merely opine what Weigel says.   And if Weigel’s excuse is that he didn’t have time to read it (and I would presume a man of his stature could have long ago read it in French), then he shouldn’t mouth off about Garrigou with such false implications…. (No matter what he says about Garrigou’s interest in mysticism below, he still is slanderously wrong, retelling the same tale that basically has been in the mainstream since the 60s. Garrigou isn’t the answer to everything—sorry folks—but he’s by far not isomorphic with this sort of simplistic characterization. And, there is NO excuse for someone of Weigel’s connections and station of life not to correct his knowledge on such things. ) 

 

Sentence 5

 (To take one example: Garrigou criticized the doctoral dissertation of a young Polish priest named Karol Wojtyła because the Pole had not used the term “divine object” of God, preferring to speak of the more personal nature of the human encounter with God.)

 

Commentary

I do not know what he cites here—this quote was sent to me by a friend.  I’ve seen this claim, and I’m going to take it on its face.  The dissertation was passed.  We should know the exact sense of the concern.  If someone denies that one can ever speak of God in the technical theological terminology of object, then one will led to say some rather astounding things not merely about scholastic theology, but also even Dei Filius.  Here, I cite something by Fr. Labourdette, to be seen in full in the book I have coming out with Jon Kirwan next year:

“We are quite fine with the fact that Fr. Daniélou speaks using a different vocabulary than our own, though we still lament the fact he so clearly is anxious to enter into the vocabulary of contemporary philosophy without ourselves benefitting from the same effort at [intellectual] sympathy. However, does he not know that the notion of object, in theological language, excludes neither the “spirit of religion,” nor, as he says later on, “the sense of mystery,” (“Les orientations présentes,” 16), and that to say that our intellect has as its objects the very mysteries of faith is not only an expression of this “rationalized theology,” namely, “neo-Thomism,” but, indeed, is an expression consecrated by the solemn teaching of the [First] Vatican Council in statements which certainly have neither the intent nor the result of emptying the mystery of its meaning, even if they do not refer to Kierkegaard's categories: “The perpetual common belief of the Catholic Church has held and holds also this: there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only in its principle but also in its object; in its principle, because in the one we know by natural reason, in the other by divine faith; in its object, because apart from what natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries that are hidden in God that can never be known unless they are revealed by God” (Vatican I, Dei filius, ch. 4; Denzinger, no. 1795 [3015]).”

 

But, we can work on the assumption that everything worked out fine.  It was likely a difference of analytic styles.  But, when someone comes to you to say, “_Never ever_ use object to speak of God,” (which I can’t imagine Wojtyla saying) you better expect some incredibly loose thinking that perhaps will end with you in a rather terrible place philosophically and theologically.   The notion of “object” (which has many senses—Go read Austin Woodbury’s notes [weird as they are, they are comprehensive], George, before you act like you know what you are talking about here) is a sane philosophical notion.  And it also is a sane notion that can be (AND HAS BEEN) removed from its explicit philosophical context to be used by the Church in her teaching.

 

Aside: looking at the digital copy of the book, I see a snippet of a remark about Maritain.  The only thing involved in this case are particular questions of politics. Even here, Garrigou wanted Maritain to have an out, though Garrigou was of the opinion that certain things that were said in Maritain could risk being taken in a sense that would deserve censure.  Please, Mr. Weigel, read Philippe Chenaux’s “Maritain devant le Saint-Office: le rôle du père Garrigou-Lagrange” before remarking.

 

Sentence 7:

Garrigou also played a considerable role in the Roman critique of ressourcement theology and was thought to have been a driving force behind Pius XII’s cautionary 1950 encyclical on what the Pope deemed “false opinions threatening to undermine the foundations of Catholic doctrine,” Humani Generis, which took particular aim at the work of Henri de Lubac.

 

Commentary

Oh, this one gives me a stroke.  When Jon Kirwan’s and my book comes out, the immense ignorance of this will be manifest.  Whoever does not engage with the documents that we there present and translate will show their bad faith.  But, George, a public intellectual, should be expected to have read in detail the controversy that engaged on the one side Garrigou-Lagrange, Labourdette, and Marie-Joseph Nicolas (but also Maritain WHO AGREED WITH THEM, though privately for he was a diplomat at the time) and, on the other, Fessard, von Balthasar, Daniélou, Bouillard, De Lubac, Bruno De Solages, and Jean-Marie Le Blonde.  Has he?  Does he know the exact details of just how much of the pressure on the SJs came from within the order?  There were those who critiqued quite vigorously from within their own ranks.  He was involved in Humani Generis, though I’m not so sure that he was the penman as some have claimed.  (The use of “[principium] rationis sufficientis” is never what Garrigou says – neither in French nor in Latin.  If nothing else, you have other writers involved.). In any case, go read HG anew and ask yourself if the one reference in no. 26 really justifies saying “which took particular aim…”. And… Hmmm… Read no. 27.  As an Eastern Catholic, I would put this differently, but if one reads this aright, it’s clear what the document is arguing against…. I feel no need to imply, like WEIGEL SEEMS TO, that this papal document is problematic.  (Though Weigel might find it tedious, allow me to use syllogistic form.  Let’s concede the point about HdL, even if it deserves several levels of qualification.  [I’ll even accept HdL’s claim that his argument doesn’t put the gratuity of grace in danger.  I’m not interested in litigating that.]. I believe that the second premise that I present below is Weigel’s position.  Thus, in form: Humani generis took particular aim at HdL’s Surnaturel.  HdL’s Surnaturel wasn’t problematic (and was even vindicated by Vatican II and the Communio school later on). Therefore, HG took aim at something later held by Vatican II.  The implication?  The best could be: and therefore what it says is wrong, in light of future teaching.  But… Even HdL said he agreed with it.  So what’s the point?  If nothing else, Garrigou’s role in the whole affair is an incredibly complicated point among many other figures and concerns.

 

Sentence 8

Long interested in mysticism and the Christian call to holiness, Garrigou was not merely a theological logic-chopper.

 

Commentary

So kind a concession by Weigel.  However, as noted above, other works by Garrigou (all of them perhaps?) show that he wasn’t a “logic chopper” anywhere in his theological and philosophical works.  (Note that the latter are left out.  That makes one question George’s knowledge of the matter.)

 

Sentence 9

His identification of the ressourcement movement with Modernism was misplaced, however, and Garrigou played no significant role in the preparation of the Second Vatican Council or at the Council itself.

 

Commentary

As Jon and I definitively show in our forthcoming book, Garrigou’s claim regarding modernism was aimed at Henri Bouillard’s garbage theory of dogmatic development. Others critiqued it with more nuance and detail than Garrigou, but Garrigou wasn’t wrong.  If you read Bouillard, you can see that he should have at least have been more careful.  Garrigou himself actually said, privately, to Maritain, who visited him DURING the Nouvelle théologie controversy, that it was Bouillard who deserved condemnation but that the other “tendencies” likely couldn’t merit a full response. 

 

I don’t have enough context about the “role” he obviously didn’t play at the Council (given that he was dying a debilitating death at the time……..).  However, his thought was refracted quite powerfully in his protégé Fr. Marie-Rosaire Gagnebet, who played an important role in the preparatory documents.  Also, Garrigou’s faithful and excellent American students Fr. Joseph C. Fenton and Emmanuel Doronzo were consultators.  Others could be listed, though if we include those from throughout the council, men like Cardinal Michael Browne, Fr. Michel Labourdette, and others could be added.  (I’m sure Jon Kirwan could help me list lots of others.). And men like Sebastian Tromp (who was immensely influential) were much in line with RGL on many points.  It’s asinine to underrate the importance of the Roman Scholastics.  The final documents of the Council regularly bear witness to their concerns. I’m not saying that what Weigel said is totally wrong, but I am noting that again, this kind of simplification—presented to the general public—is just one more reiteration of a certain tired narrative.

Allow a sidebar.

People of Weigel’s generation seem to disdain the Roman Trads. And I understand their frustration. I feel that the endless critical attitude of the Trads (aimed at real problems, mind you….) has enervated their ability to engage with the intellectual tradition of the era that preceded the Council. A great example of this is the fact that when they looked to do something in moral theology, they merely republished an old manual summary by Dominic Prümmer. I don’t think Prümmer is the best (Merkelback is the best OP moral theology manualist), but if the folks involved with that Prümmer project wanted to really do something of use, they would have translated the 3 volume Prümmer. But, it seems that the genres of works that they write are so taken up with the practical liturgical battle over the Roman Rite and politics that they have slowly but surely forgotten what it is to look at all the great theologians of the Roman Church now forgotten. How many useless articles on Covid political commentary were written instead of them hunkering down and doing something with true lasting significance? Just because midwit red meat sells, that doesn’t make it morally right to do so. (The trads have critiqued modern capitalism well enough to know this too………)

But the Trads should be listened to. The Roman Church’s liturgical woes are real…. When I compare a weekly (or daily…..) Divine Liturgy to a normal Roman Catholic Sunday Mass, it is staggering the immense difference that exists between the semiotics of the two ritual forms. And when you compare the liturgical continuity that exists in the East with the immense discontinuity that does exist in the West, it takes your breath away. People (including Bishops and higher up) just bumble on and ignore this (and immediately suppress people for pointing out)… It’s staggering. If reforms of the scale as those done to the Roman Rite were foisted on the Melkite Church, boy I would love to watch—with utter support for my strong-willed Arab brethren—as they basically told Rome to pack their bags on that one, lest their very tradition itself be damaged by altering the deep structure of the liturgical patrimony. [I fear that we Ruthenians would cave… But, I would hope some of us would fight for our tradition for some time.]

I’m sure someone will accuse me of being a closet trad. Nope. I don’t like attending the TLM, though I still occasionally take my wife (who is still Roman Catholic). Not my spiritual home and not my [sui iuris] church. Not at all my spiritual-liturgical home. I attended for years as Roman Catholic before I found the Byzantine East. And it was a haven from the shipwreck that is the great majority of Roman Catholic liturgies in the US. But never my home.

But, it is insanity to me that people can’t admit in the West—without being accused of being unfaithful to Roman authority, “the Council” (and all of us who have read the documents know how the reforms definitely didn’t match what the bishops called for at the Council)—that when you change the entire liturgy of the hours, the cycle of all your Mass readings, the collects / etc. of the Mass, fabricate new Canons [not only the 3 new ones that are regularly used but all the other ones that are optional too], change your calendar significantly, practically abandon your liturgical chant tradition, etc. you immensely alter the very semiotics of the transmission of the tradition in the liturgy. (You don’t destroy it. But it is insanity to act as though the liturgical transmission of the tradition wouldn’t be affected by such widescale changes, eliminations, creations, etc.) I know, I know… “the Pope has the authority to do this”. But, I would ask the important quesiton: is such authority here exercised legitimately? For the good of the Church one—especially private persons—must not rise up publicly against the Pope when something is done unjustly. (And this is the same kind of thing that holds for all communities. One should generally respect authority. Not because authority is always right. But because the common good presumes filial piety in one’s criticism of authority. Open revolution is only very rarely justified.) But, at the time in the 1960s / 70s, too many were ready for the space age and also were conditioned to never register questions about ecclesiastical authority. Thus, they just accepted the changes. (I remember stories about an old curmudgeonly conservative priest at the Roman Catholic parish where I grew up as a child. He disliked the changes but was a “company man”, a classmate of the bishop. Imagine if the “company men” objected to the wholesale changes to the Roman Rite… How different your form would have been.)

And, I assure you, I have no desire to go back to the Roman Rite in whatever form. I have found my spiritual home. But I am noting that these kinds of concerns by the trads are not wrong. They drive me insane with their midwit commentary and—excuse the uncouth son of Appalachia—bitching and moaning online. I expect more of them, but their broad culture is a constant disappointment to me. There are many very good people among their numbers who are just trying to find a sane ecclesial home. But, I refuse to be silent about my opinion that they seem to just be marking time in rage, awaiting the metaphysically impossible return of the past into the present, basically talking the same narrative as what they set years ago when their general “movement” started. For example, with the anniversary of Vatican II, we’ll hear about whom? Lefebvre and Ottaviani…… Maybe a few well worn others. But it will be mostly rinse and repeat. Imagine, though, if someone wrote a long article on the role of Gagnebet at the Council. Or Tromp. Or Parente. Or Browne. Or Doronzo. Or even Fenton. I personally think also men like Journet, though I know that trads hate him because of his political positions.

(Let me make an observation, though. I have done a bit of interacting with the folks at Arouca Press. Sometimes, they publish very trad-normal books. But, their founder also tries to publish other texts of greater merit to expand the patrimony of the Trads. I think that this is very admirable. In fact, they are publishing Fenton’s Council diaries and are publishing Doronzo’s excellent texts. And they commission new translations. I want to note this as a signal case of what trads should be doing. There are other examples, no doubt. But, how much repetition of the same old things… with some spiced up Viganoism…!)

But, what is more, the schizophrenia of “pre” and “post” conciliarism, which exists in Weigel’s implicitly victorious-Communio narrative, needs overcoming. To merely tap into the “preconciliar” world by looking solely at the Communio folks is not enough (and snidely commenting about the “preconciliar neo-Thomists”). I’m sorry Bishop Barron. I’m sorry George Weigel. I’m sorry so many of a certain generation. Notice very well that I’m not looking to toss the Communio folks overboard. There has been immense diversity theologically even merely in the West, let alone in the Universal Church, through the ages. I’m very (VERY—to the point of tedium) aware of the weakness of my own dear Garrigou. But… While I can admit that, why is it that one cannot admit the weaknesses of their side? Why is it that only one side must always concede it was wrong? Why is it that a certain kind of conservative refuses to admit that perhaps there is a bigger tale?—As though that would immediately concede ground that the theological progressives would abuse.

Some trads are saying that we need to just put the Council behind us. I’m noticing from conservatives a kind of narrative that says, “Those problems were from the past. We need to fight the foe today.” I think both are wrong. As an Eastern Catholic, I see the great good of the Council. It hasn’t always been easy for us either, but our experience is very different from that of the West. But, those who want Thomists like me to stop fighing over the crisis that preceded the Council are  wrong. It is immensely important to understand the effects of the Nouvelle théologie crisis—and the truth of it, not merely a narrative that so simplifies the concerns of faithful theologians.

Sentence 10

Nonetheless, a post-conciliar Church would eventually find use for the finely honed distinctions of the Neo-Scholasticism he embodied, although it was some thirty years after his death in 1964.

 

Commentary

It seems that Weigel is here noting the way that certain OPs during JP II’s era exercised influence. That being said, it is not clear how much this thin praise is meant to wash back over Garrigou himself. The selection is taken from a larger section devoted to various figures. (The hit parade, including the selection on Maritain and even Gilson, are such simplifications… The Maritain one, in particular, where one speaks of his Thomist existentialism is an example of how people of Weigel’s call Maritain and “existential Thomist”—but I could write an entire screed on how that’s the wrong way to think of Maritain. But, it seems that instead of reading all of Maritain’s works in detail, one would rather rest upon the laurels of lazy repetition of summaries from one’s youth….)

Some Notes regarding (for lack of better term) the Metaphysics involved in the Incarnation

This is just a dump of several long comments I posted over at William Albrecht’s channel on Youtube, following my recent, very edifying talk with him and Fr. Christiaan Kappes. Just wanted to save it, since I lost 45 minutes of the work day…

A General Remark to clarify something I said:

Glory to Jesus Christ! I should make clear that at one point I too quickly conceded something to Fr. Christiaan (without him asking me to do so, though) regarding the vision of the divine essence that Christ would have had as a wayfarer. I too quickly said: "as God". I tried to correct this but probably wasn't clear enough. We Thomists hold that Christ as a "wayfaring" man (prior to his ressurection and ascension) had the vision of God, though it was in the heights of his soul and only articulated through His human acts of knowledge as a wayfarer (though these acts were perfectly subordinated to his vision, itself a radiation of the divine knowledge he had as God, somewhat like how His utterly lofty grace as man was a kind of first radiation of his substantial holiness _as word_).

Although I think Maritain deserves a couple of nuances, the general bent of his outlook seem correct to me, for the sake of maintaining the true humanity of Christ as the "Wayfaring Word" (my expression): "We ask ourselves, or rather we ask theologians, if the cnoclusion to be drawn from this is not that the supreme evidence that Christ, in his Human soul, had concerning His own divinity by the beatific vision did not pass into the experience of Himself proper to the homo viator in the form only of an absolute certitude or knowledge which was sur-conscious or super-conscious (I mean retained at the supreme spiritual point of consciousness), and neither signifiable in concepts or communicable [directly qua beatific, for that is only "communicated" in the vision itself]. And that, in His human soul, it was by his infused and prophetic knowledge, employed as an instrument [here we have something like theandric acts of will, but applied to intellection] by His own Divine Nature and His own Divine Science that He knew with communicable and reflexively conscious knowledge that He was the Incarnate Word? May not the same things also be said of the knowledge He possessed concerning His redemptive mission?" (Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, 1998/2002, p. 468).

Maritain might push just a tiny bit too hard on Christ's "progress" in grace and knowledge, but the broad point seems quite interesting. Anyway, just wanted to be very clear concerning such matters!
Peace, Matthew

Second posting - regarding the knowledge we have of particulars in knowing God.
Glory to Jesus Christ!
I should have been a bit more on my toes. I knew, also, thought that we had two different angelologies. Technically, for the Thomist at least, the angels know all things in "ideas" that are participateive echoes of God's own creative ideas (as you note). Creative ideas, as belonging to the "practical order" are not the same as a speculative idea, so the model needs to change. Technically, the angel can have experiential knowledge within this practical idea (see the article by John Deely that I recommended). Here too, although Thomas acknowledged this, the Scotists pushing back made the Thomists more conceptually sharp.

One must also be careful against thinking of the exemplar as being a kind of mere model in the artist's mind, a kind of pre-copy like the Demiurge of Plato, a kind of exact pattern. A great artist actually has a whole latitude of creativity "built into" the experience that gives rise to the creative idea, which itself is worked out _in the product itself_. I think of the organist who is improvising based upon some piece of ecclesiastical music: there are so many options open to him, spontaneously (and often with great flair), all budding forth from his "art". (I would go further and speak of the "poetic" experience, but then that would require us to adopt an explicitly Maritainnian vocabulary here. Some listeners have been primed to dislike Maritain because of certain falsehoods or, at least, grave distortions that circulate regarding him.)

I should wonder, though, if depending upon each of our own unique participations in the light of glory (understood as the subjective capacitating of our minds for the vision of God) we will uniquely know refractions of these aspects of the "divine ideas" when we know God. (Thus, one saint who was an equestrian will sing the divine praise of this aspect of horses, whereas the old farmer with his faithful old mare will be able to tell the heavenly host of the grandeur of God who had allowed for the creation / evolution of such an animal that was able to provide for man in his needs, etc.)

In fact, just to double check the text in Aquinas even, I do believe that such difference is completely justified, given the distance that separates our own blessed vision of God and His own comprehensive self-knowledge. As a Byzantine Catholic who has a great love of St. Gregory Palamas, I am very sensitive to this post-Cappadocian insistence on the transcendence of God even in our beatific vision of Him—schematized, especially by the time of St. Gregory, in terms of the distinction between His essence and his activities / energies. Though I have issues with the hard distinction between these two, the basic point about our various participation in the divine life is well attested. The Orthodox present at Florence kept asserting this point. An amusing text from Russell's book on Palamism bears witness to it.

This first is from Cardinal Giuliano Cesaini: But the Greeks, [Cesarini goes on to say] were holding that they do not see God himself, but certain lights [alas, the misunderstanding of the discussion of Tabor will often play out here, as we’ll see in weeks to follow], and in this there was great difficulty, indeed, such as nearly upset the whole business. At length, they yielded to argument and recognized that the souls of the blessed will see God, Three and One, as he is, but they wanted to have put into the cedula that some would see less and others more, and it was thought good that this should be included, since “in our Father’s house, there are many mansions.” (Cited in Russell, 25)

In the bull of union proposed to the Orthodox, this was somewhat incorporated (see the end): The souls of those who, after having received baptism have incurred no stain of sin whatever and those souls who, after having contracted the stain of sin, have been cleansed, either while in their bodies or after having been divested of them as stated above, are received immediately into heaven and see clearly God himself, one and three, as He is, though some more perfectly than others, according to the diversity of merits. (Denzinger, no. 1305)
The simplest place for this in Aquinas is ST I, q. 12, a. 7 where he distinguishes between our beatific knowledge of God and His own comprehensive self-knowledge.

Then, immediately after this question, he takes the next step: then, do we know all things therein? Here, he makes the point regarding the diversity of vision even as regards such particular things known in the vision of God. To this end, consider the corpus of a. 8. Obviously, it is marked by scholastic "clunkiness", but the point is ultimately correct I believe:
The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above (Article 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it sees God.

And a text regarding the “2 esse” question:

This was a great question, Nick. Truth be told, I should have been better prepared than I was. Just this past year, when yet again thinking about that famous text from the De unione verbi of Aquinas, I thought, "I do believe that Maritain was broadly right here in his interaction with Fr. Hermann Diepen in the 50s". (The fact that Fr. Jean-Hervé Nicolas goes generally in the same line is also encouraging.) Last night, since my wife was already asleep with the girls, I reread Appendix IV in Maritain's _Degrees of Knowledge_, where he deals with the topic of subsistence, half philosophically and half as applied to the question of the Incarnation. In his later edition of this appendix (responding to some articles by aforementioned Fr. Diepen), he concedes that the human nature of Christ would have a kind of "esse secondarium", a kind of derived existence, though that existence is only exercised by the subsistent subject that is the Word. (The Thomists in the same line as Maritain distinguish subsistence from esse / act of existence. One of the clearest presentations of this can be found in Phillips' manual series.) It is not clear whether or not the De Unione Verbi comes right before or right after the relevant text in ST III. However, the idea of distinguishing between the personal esse (the primary existence of the Word) and the derived secondary substantial esse (of the human nature) seems to meet some of the metaphysical challenges here (above all, the idea that Christ's human nature would be constitutively actuated directly by uncreated act). I recognize, however, that this is a major theological issue and am very being (charitably) corrected! Fr. Christiaan, for his part, probably is more comfortable with the duality of existence. I think he was surprised that I myself gave as much as I did. ;-)

More on two esse

Just quickly now following up before getting off to work on some things. Well said in the 2nd paragraph. If the De unione verbi is authentic (as it seems to be), one should take to heart the fact that he there distinguishes what I call (following Maritain and Nicolas) the "personal esse", though "the esse of the supposit" (or like) is totally fine (same point). The critical text in the De unione is as follows. Please excuse the very quick translation:

Et ideo sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi, et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi. Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum, sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum. Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale - quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de filio Dei, ut supra habitum est - non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium. Si autem in Christo essent duo supposita, tunc utrumque suppositum haberet proprium esse sibi principale. Et sic in Christo esset simpliciter duplex esse.

Thus, just as Christ is, simply speaking, one on account of the unity of supposit [i.e., the one hypostasis which is the Word, which provides the single subsistence of the Incarnate word], and two in a qualified sense, namely, on account of His two natures, so too he has, simply speaking, one esse on account of the one eternal esse of the eternal supposit [that is the Word]. However, there also is "another" esse of this supposit, not inasmuch as He is eternal but, rather, inasmuch has He became man in time. Now, this esse, even though it is not accidental (because "man" is not predicated of the Son of God as an accident, as we discussed earlier), is not,however, the principal esse of His supposit but, rather, is a secondary [or we might say "derived"] esse. However, if there were two supposits in Christ [which, of course, there are not because of the Hypostatic unity in persona / in supposito], then both supposits would have its own proper, principal esse, meaning that Christ would have two esses simply speaking. [But we aren't Nestorians, so he does not.]

But then there is also the striking response to the objection:

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec tamen simpliciter dicendum est quod Christus sit duo secundum esse; quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque esse suppositum aeternum. Et similiter etiam dicendum est ad alia.

Thus, to the first, it must be said that the esse of Christ's human nature is not the divine esse; however, we likewise must not say, speaking in an utterly unqualified sense [simpliciter, non secundum quid], that Christ would have a second esse [simpliciter], for the two esses in question are not related in equal fashion to the eternal supposit [since the human esse is derived and "of the nature but not of the supposit"].

I have not yet read Michael Gorman's _Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union_, but I am surprised that, upon a text search, I do not see Maritain or Nicolas cited at all. However, he does cite the work of Marie-Hélène Deloffre, which is a good study of all this. (Still, I think that the speculative value of at least grappling with Maritain and Nicolas is enlightening. I'm not sure if it's part of the somewhat muted—but very real in my opinion, based on my days as a graduate student there—dislike and dismissal of Maritain by the philosophy faculty at Catholic University. (I say this out of great filial piety for the place, which I really love. However, although Dean Dougherty was a lover of Maritain, many of the folks there nowadays were highly biased against him. Never was quite sure, but there was a strong whiff of "Thomas's texts only, along with the contemporary literature" for some there. I'm a bit of a pugilist, by contrast, in defense of the old scholastic debates....

Ahhh, well... I really do need to get to work. Blessings!


Peace,

Matthew

Which Nous is this Nous? (Comments on the various parallels between noetics of the Christian East and West related to the term _nous_.)

Another Facebook wall response that should be saved somewhere….

Someone flagged me on this question: “Serious question for 'theologians' of sorts (since all of my books are all packed up currently). My question is this: Is there a Thomistic equivalent of the 'nous' as used and understood by the Eastern Fathers?”

My response:
Glory to Jesus Christ!

This is a great question. I had a conversation with a wise Dominican recently. We were discussing other matters when this topic came up in passing. He confirmed what I have thought (and... what I have taught if it comes up in class): the notion of _nous_, which you're going to find used in various ways, covers a number of phenomena in the Scholastic lexicon.

The quasi-generic meaning of "nous" is, as others above have noted, an ability (and its related act) to know in a direct manner, without an intrinsic mediation of a discursus.

For this reason, as some said above, _intellectus_, insight into first principles (a natural-intellect capacity) fills this role. (There is a role, however, for extrinsic, dialectical reasoning to enable this kind of direct insight.)

However, even here at the level of nature there is also the ability to know defined wholes (the work of the "first operation of the intellect"). Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, citing Aristotle, emphasizes in several places how this is the work of "nous". (Fr. Boncenski also provided RGL with some further backup for this claim.) Fr. Garrigou very often emphasized the need to pay heed to defining of terms. Even if this risks a "conceptualism", the point also helps to prevent discursive rationality from formalizing philosophy and theology. (I prefer not here getting into the whole "conceptualism" issue. It's just too detailed for a Facebook discussion.. - Says the man who is writing a huge response!) Note, also, that extrinsic reasoning comes to bear here. (Think of the way that the predicables—which pertain to second intentions formed by the first operation of the intellect—are discussed in the dialectics of the _Topics_.)

So, up to now, we have been at the level of "nature". Knowledge through the first and second operations of the intellect are primarily direct, even if they might involve dialectical reasoning (in order to clear the underbrush so that the phenomenon in question might stand forth). Thus, we are speaking of: defining and _intellectus_.

You'll find this sort of language at times in Eastern authors.

But….!

Another important strand—and the one that is most important in the end—will really be speaking in the register of the supernatural order.

(Aside: Do not listen to those who say that distinctions between nature and grace cannot be found in the East. There are various ways that this is articulated, but by the time of Maximus and quite powerfully in Palamas, you'll find it with striking clarity. Obviously, we must not read Latin problematics on to them. But, it makes total sense that St. Gregory needed to articulate this in the controversies over grace and divinization.)

Here, the Thomist position on faith, which is not discursive, is built on a kind of super-analogy (cf. Journet, Nicolas, Maritain, and even implicitly Garrigou) with _intellectus_. Our knowledge through faith is direct knowledge, elicited in the supernatural light of the truthfulness of God who reveals (and who gives us the subjective capacity for eliciting such an act of supernatural knowledge). This faith-knowledge is also sometimes what falls under _nous_ in Eastern authors.

But, even more, to the degree that such Eastern Spiritual texts push toward the apophatic, experiential (or quasi-experiential, as the Thomist in me would say...), it seems clear to my eyes that _nous_ is there used in the sense of the Thomist notion of the gifts of understanding, perhaps knowledge, and indeed wisdom—all which are a perfecting of faith, the latter being mediated through the love of charity in a unique way that is the most quasi-unmediated in character. (We "taste" the mysteries through the mediation of God active as the vivifying principle of our supernatural life.) The issue of the mediation of this knowledge should be read in light of Gardeil's _La Structure...._ and the important debates / discussions that followed upon it.

Finally (and actually connected with Gardeil's work in fact), we have something related to the Augustinian notion of _mens_: the spiritual heights of the soul; the soul as mind, not as soul. (This represents, on the level of substance-constitutive, a parallel to the intellect as intellect and the intellect as rational.) This would be the height of the soul as the "insertion point" for grace (or "toothing stone" expecting it, as some would say this - both metaphors have their dangers, but metaphors help us grope toward truth—just remember that for the strict Thomists, the "toothing stone" is a negative obediential potency). In any case, this sense of _nous_ would be _the spiritual heights of the soul, that part of us which is first divinized by grace, and from which will flow all the radiation of grace over the rest of the "organism"_.

So.... In sum....

_Nous_ is going to cover:
In the order of nature:

Acts of the first "operation" of the intellect in defining notions.

Acts of the second "operation" of the intellect, in particular first principles grasped through _intellectus_ and _synderesis_

We might perhaps add to this, as well, "Intellectus" in the moral order of particular truths. (See the virtues annexed to prudence.)

There would also likely be here poetic knowledge, somewhat like what Maritain describes.
Then, in the order of grace:

Our foundational capacity, as spirit, for the reception of grace ("obediential potency", or _mens_)

Faith

Then the contemplative gifts of the Holy Spirit (understanding, knowledge, and wisdom), in particular wisdom

Whew……

Addendum:

I should add, that the "active intellect" is also important behind a number of these aforementioned groupings. It would be useful to read Gilson's (still in French, I think) article on Aquinas's development of the notion. The "active intellect" is the spiritually highest point of the intellect's actuality in the order of nature. Thus, it, along with _soul-as-mens_ will be the best parallel for _nous_

Random sources on implicit faith

(This was posted on FB, but I thought I should back it up….)

There are at least three threads to pull on here. 

 

First: ST I-II, q. 89,a . 6 (Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone).  This is a capital text.  I would need to go digging through the Salmanticenses and Cajetan. I would think that something also is reflected, more briefly in Billuart. 

 

On this theme, it is useful to consider the thought provoking content on this head in Maritain’s “The Immanent Dialectic of the First Act of Freedom,” in The Range of Reason.  He engages the them in relation to the Thomist school.  The text, even if touched up here and there, was broadly accepted, from what I recall, by Frs. Labourdette OP and Nicolas OP, both of whom are very safe theologically.  (I am getting blue in the face nowadays, though, feeling like I need to defend Maritain all the time because of certain polemicists who like to trot him out as a bogey man for so many post-conciliar ills.  I know his works very well, and even where I might differ with him, even on this or that point of politics, I’m not ready to be so dogmatic.  Okay, end of potential rant……)  There may be something in Journet’s Église du verbe incarné as well…. Just went over to my shelf to look at vol. 2.  Yes, indeed.  See pages 763-799.  This deals with the problem of invincible ignorance in these matters directly.

 

Second: Look at relevant commentaries on the treatise on faith.  In particular, see commentaries on ST II-II, q. 2, a. 5-7; also, related see q. 1, a. 7. Look at Garrigou’s commentary on those texts.  I just now ordered Ramirez’s De fide divina, which I really should just have… Moreover, see Labourdette’s recently published, 149-161 and, in particular, the excursus on pages 310 to 355.

 

Finally, there is the issue, as John noted well, concerning baptism “in voto.”  On such sacramental matters, one must always consult Doronzo, for to do otherwise is to court superficial presentism in comparison with his magisterial Thomistic synthesis, which bears witness to how much theological culture has jettisoned.   See article 9 (p. 104-134) and ch. 9 as a whole (on baptism by water, fire, and blood).

 

Also, see Ch. 5 of Hugon’s _Hors d l’église point de salut._

Rambling on Revelation to a Monk in Saskatchewan

Glory to Jesus Christ!

Dear Hieromonk Gregory,

For some reason, your remark is not visible right now. I saw it last night. This very point in your text is the thing that left me thinking, "Have I totally collapsed the school together in my interpretation." Now that you say this, I do recall your citation of Fr. Donneaud. I suppose, I just immediately thought, "Oh, alas, here we go; there is this narrative that would have, for example, M-R Gagnebet on the doorstep of Charlier and Chenu's own critique of conclusion theology without knowing it / admitting it." (I'm referring to a recent RT article. In the end, I read a clear lineage intellectually that runs thus, with continuous development: Gardeil-Garrigou [NOT Chenu, no matter what all the Chenu supporters say]-Gagnebet-Labourdette-Nicolas. Upon reading that article, I at once felt profound intellectual sympathy with Fr. Donneaud, for I too am a critic of an overly-scientia understanding of theology. However, I felt that he was trying to do something else historically here, and to attach Fr. Gagnebet to a current of thought that was not his own. Perhaps I need to go back and read that article, though.) In any event, the use of _revelabilia_ has always been a bit forced to me, always feeling a bit like that annoying way that Thomists slip into worrying about words and hyper-commentary rather than laying out the argument as such. (I even sometimes feel like everyone just starts with Charlier-Bonnefoy-Gilson without thinking about the fact that few later Thomists make a big and central deal out of this language. This is, in my opinion, the danger of the Gilson-esque textual-historicist Thomism, though....)


This topic was presented to me indirectly by Maritain, who deploys the distinction of the _ratio formale obiecti ut res_ and _ut obiectum_ for his own particular views on modern science. (I personally think Maritain is right, but this is not the place to enter that separate argument.) I would caution against drawing an equivalence between the _rfo ut res_ and _material object_. The language that Maritain uses (and I believe he is spot on - too often ignored by scholars today, due to prejudices still in the air) is "intelligibility appeal" to capture the notion that something that is "objected" can be considered: (a) on the side of the object as disclosing itself (rfo ut res); (b) on the side of the knower and the power / habitus to which it is related (precisely ut obiectum). This distinction is most often used for distinguishing these matters of faith-theology-mystical experience, but the same thing could be applied to the theological virtues as well, which share the same object ut res est (Deitas ut sic), but not precisely ut obiectum est (different for faith, hope, and charity). Oh well, that's really an aside. What is more important to my mind is that the Thomists, at least bigger names among their ranks, including Capreolus, pretty early on began speaking of theology as primarily being about conclusions. (And this is distortive in my opinion, above all if it is viewed as being concerned with objectively illative conclusions. But see note * below.) For instance (caps only for emphasis), Defensiones, prol., concl. 5: "Ex quibus omnibus patet quod articuli fidei se habent sicut principia theologiae et non sicut conclusiones; et CONSEQUENTER THEOLOGIA NON EST DE HIS SICUT DE CONCLUSIONIBUS SCITIS PER EAM, SICUT NECT ALIQUA SCIENTIA EST DE SUIS PRINCIPIIS SICUT DE SCITIS SED SOLUM DE CONCLUSIONIBUS QUAE EX PRINCIPIIS CONSEQUUNTUR." That alone is enough to push back on the desire to say "get behind John of St. Thomas, go back before him." In my opinion, Congar, despite his great intelligence and desire to work for the Church, was also a partisan - someone who explicitly wished to do away with Baroque scholasticism. (See Jon Kirwan's citation concerning his conversation with Chenu about this.) Also, Congar himself noted similar texts in Cajetan. This has distorted the outlooks even many OPs who were influenced by Y. Congar and feel a kind of filial obligation to Congar, and the kind of "Year Zero" mentality concerning scholastics like Garrigou, who truth be told, are in continuity with a great tradition of articulation, which then extends down even through JH Nicolas (despite the fact that the latter seems unwilling to be too positive about his own dependence upon the vein that passes through Garrigou-Lagrange). In Cajetan, see nos. 1 and 12 of his comments on ST I , q. 1, a. 2. Also, the very use of the term "virtual" for the containment of theological conclusions in the de fide principles of sacred theology means something quite important: they don't share the same formal status and hence represent a form of objective inference. Whence, in the end, JoST is just developing what is implicit in Cajetan. It is dangerous (for all the reasons I decried in Nova et Vetera) and needs to be balanced by the sapiential tasks of theology. However, that will get us down that rabbit hole....

Now, to be in the "genus" of revealed knowledge surely is an important thing to bear in mind, so as to avoid the idea that theology somehow departs from faith, into its own wholly dependent domain full of lovely virtually revealed conclusions. That's a real danger, I know. But, nonetheless, already in Cajetan, there is a discussion of the distinction of formal objects (ut res obiectum est), and this would need to give rise to the notion of virtual revelation, which is already implied therein. The Church herself has implicitly recognized this distinction in her various types of censure. The formal motive of assent is quite different in theological knowledge than it is in formally-revealed truths—and this is even the case when it comes to arguments from suitability on behalf of the principles themselves. The real danger is to reduce this to a mere scientific assent concerning conclusions precisely as conclusions. However, pace Fr. Donneaud (as I remember in the article, which on the whole is good, if enraging because of how it neglects to do the necessary genealogy back further), who seems to think that perhaps only Fr. Gagnebet sort of saw this, I have utterly clear evidence (in publication) concerning how even Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange saw this, as did Maritain and Fr. Muñiz. In fact, Gagnebet was definitely getting this from Garrigou. I'm going abroad a bit here, so I apologize. I think, in the end, one could say that Cajetan's position is ultimately reconcilable with John of St. Thomas, especially when one reads the latter in light of folks like Labourdette (e.g., see "Théologie: l'intelligence de la foi").


(The following remark is not directed at you but at the many thinkers who still think that everything not in line with Chenu-Charlier-Congar-Gilson et al. is just backward and out-of-date Thomism.) I have become quite embittered at the notion that some teacher today is able to jump the centuries to tell us about how all things were distorted up until the most recent interpretation of things. This attitude, vaunted to the heights by the generation most active from 1940 to 1970, has done great damage. I would much rather have had men like Fr. Michel Labourdette and Doronzo win the day in the 40s and the 60s respectively, for their account of these matters, based upon the centuries of Thomist (and broader inter scholae) disputes, seems far more durable to my eyes than the latest synthesis garnered at the hands of a generally historicist method.


Ultimately, as regards the distinction between the formal motive for faith and theology: the misunderstanding of this was related to the problems leading to Charlier's text being placed on the Index (cf. Parente, Boyer, and Gagnebet for more on that). I do wish you had noted quite clearly the fact of this indexing and had engaged in the discussion. I'm not trying to rip open wounds of old, but the concerns raised by the Roman theologians at that time were merited. If your volume was based upon your dissertation at the Angelicum, I would almost venture to say that I'm scandalized that the OPs directing you didn't think it even of use to cite the articles by Gagnebet. This would bespeak a grand partisanship that basically is ready to allow Congar's reading of the entire history of the crisis of the 1930s and 1940s continue to reign without any nuance or challenge.


Again, allow me to say again that I am very glad to have someone else out there engaging these topics. If I'm a bit passionate, I do not mean to be dismissive, etc.!

I must be off. Apologies to ramble. Again, all the best! Fraternally,

Matthew

* As regards the notion of "conclusions" and virtual revelation. I do think that one can say that still there are "conclusions" in the case of the defense of principles. These are not objectively inferential but, rather, make use of extrinsic middle terms. They are topical or rhetorical - and truth be told, they are the most important of "arguments" in theology. (Insofar as they are seeking to set for the intelligibility of the mysteries of faith, they are theological.) Thus, while most Thomist have spoken of virtual revelation in terms that would lend themselves purely to objectively-inferred scientific conclusions, I would just broaden the term to include all sorts of conclusions. On this, though, see my recent work in Nova et Vetera.