Taken from part 4, disp. 1, q. 1 of the Philosophia iuxta incon- cussa tutissimaque Divi Thomae Dogmata of Antoine Goudin, O.P. (1639-1695):
“And here Descartes is not to be endured, when he decrees (for the time placing aside every other principle as being doubtful) that the mind enters upon knowledge of things from this, “I think,” from which he immediately infers, “Therefore, I am.” For, so that I may not press upon the others, if the mind sets aside even our principle (of contradiction) as being in doubt with all the others, there will also be doubt whether he who thinks is, or is not. For, if it is possible for one and the same thing to be and not be, he could think and, nevertheless, not be.”
(Cited by Garrigou-Lagrange on several occasions.)