From The 3 Ages
We have not given this study the form of a manual because we are not seeking to accumulate knowledge, as is too often done in academic overloading, but to form the mind, to give it the firmness of principles and the suppleness required for the variety of their applications, in order that it may thus be capable of judging the problems which may arise. The humanities were formerly conceived in this fashion, whereas often today minds are transformed into manuals, into repertories, or even into collections of opinions and of formulas, whose reasons and profound consequences they do not seek to know.
Moreover, questions of spirituality, because they are most vital and at times most hidden, do not easily fall into the framework of a manual; or to put the matter more clearly, great risk is run of being superficial in materially classifying things and in substituting an artificial mechanism for the profound dynamism of the life of grace, of the infused virtues, and of the gifts. This explains why the great spiritual writers have not set forth their thought under this schematic form, which risks giving us a skeleton where we seek for life.
From the sense of mystery
Pages 110–111
The term “chiaroscuro” is used to describe a way of painting. It refers to a manner of handling or distributing the light and darkness found in a painting in a way that helps to detach the figures in the paint- ing. The chiaroscuro provided certain artists with a great resource for obtaining this relief. Painters enamored with light, such as the Véronèse and numerous other artists of the Venetian school, use it very little. They seek to indicate the plans of objects in the midst of nuances, tones, half-tones, and pristine colors. For them, the background of the paint- ing is more often as luminous as the foreground. There is something similar, in the case of the intellectual viewpoint, in most of the phil- osophical and theological works that use very little (or virtually no) intellectual chiaroscuro. With great brevity, they provide an exposition of the errors and difficulties of great problems and exclude the shadows as much as is possible. However, it is also often the case that truth is very little placed in relief by this method. Thus, in many of the manuals of philosophy and theology, one does not see the difficulty that drives the very problems being discussed.
De Revelatione
Around 126n76 (I have a problem with my PDF pagination)
Some modern manuals of moral theology contain almost nothing other than casuistic theo-
logy, and in them moral theology appears like a science of grave and minor sins to be avoided rather than a science concerning virtues to be perfected. Likewise, many modern treatises of ascetic theology and mystical theology do not proceed fully enough from the rightful foun- dation of moral theology concerning the nature and progress of the infused virtues and of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Thus, they come to be constructed in too empirical a fashion and are lacking in doctrinal value. Ultimately, these defects lead to the diminution of the notion of the eminent unity of sacred theology.
This same critique can be found in the beginning of De Beatitudine almost word for word. The English translation, however, is bad.
Also, page 149
As regards the theoretical part of the treatise on revelation, one must note that frequently, in theological manuals, this part is reduced to a brief prologue concerning the possibility of revelation and of the miracles by which revelation can be known. Such a prologue hardly suffices for the defense of revelation against rationalists. Indeed, they begin from the denial of the supernatural order and set up naturalism as a fundamental principle in accord with which the true historical methodology must be instituted. Such a methodology excludes all supernatural facts from the history of Christian- ity, and also from the history of all other religions, because [they hold that] the supernatural order is a priori impossible.
Order of Things
page 167
Now, is this the same as saying that critical realism dispels all obscurity in these matters? Oh, most certainly not! And while certain manuals of Thomistic philosophy speak little about the mystery of knowledge (because their primary end is to insist on what is clear and absolutely certain about knowledge), if true Thomists were asked to write expressly about the mystery of sense knowledge, or about the mystery of intellectual knowledge, and about their relations to one another, they could easily show that we find here a marvelous chiaro- scuro, more beautiful than all of those painted by Rembrandt. And as, in this chiaroscuro, the two elements that compose it mutually buttress each other, the true Thomist does not wish to suppress the mystery but, rather, to set it forth in its true place. He has as much sense of mystery as does anyone else—certainly much more than the Cartesian idealist as well as the materialist—for, not wishing to deny any of the elements of the problem, no matter how distant they may be from one another (i.e., matter and spirit, as well as the sensible and the intelligible), he knows that the intimate mode of their union remains (and forever will remain) profoundly mysterious. This is what we still must show, though without in any way diminishing the first, unshakable certitude which we have discussed in this chapter.
Page 234
The order to follow in psychology, at least in a work of Peripatetic philosophy, is obviously that of the De anima and not that of the theological treatise De homine.13 Granted, it is easy to write a manual of philosophy by transcribing the parts of the Summa theologiae that are related to being, truth, the sensible world, the soul, God, and moral thought. However, a philosophical treatise should be something more than such a juxtaposition of texts.
Page 239-40
he doctrine of act and potency is also the principle of the classical proofs of God’s existence and the foundation of the Nicomachean Ethics: a power is spoken of in relation to its act, and its act with respect to its object;25 accordingly, man, as a rational animal, must act rationally, according to a fitting end. In brief, the distinction of act and potency is the foundation of the whole of Aristotelian thought. Therefore, it is sovereignly important to show how Aristotle reached this utterly fertile distinction and to show how the existence of real potency (really distinct from act, no matter how perfect it may be) is for him the only way to reconcile the principle of contradiction (or, identity) with the existence of the profound becom- ing which reaches down to the very substance of corruptible beings.26
To present this doctrine concerning potency and act in another, a priori manner, as happens in many manuals, is to suggest that it has merely fallen from the sky or that it is only a simple, pseudo-philo- sophical translation of common language, whose worth still must be established, as has been said by Henri Bergson. In such an undertaking, there is no longer any profundity in analyzing matters. One is content with some quasi-nominal definitions of potency and act, and it is no longer clear how and why potency differs from the simply possible being, from privation, as well as from imperfect act or from the Leibni- zian force / virtuality, which is only an impeded form of act.27 Likewise, one can limit oneself merely to enunciating the relations of potency and act in the axioms proposed as commonly received in the School [i.e., the Thomist school, Suarezian school, etc.] without seeing their true value on which, nevertheless, everything depends. We must admit this fact: this fundamental chapter of metaphysics, i.e., regarding act and potency, remains in a state of great intellectual poverty in many manuals when we compare them to the first two books of Aristotle’s Physics and to the commentary that St. Thomas left us concerning it. The method of discovery has been too neglected in philosophy, a method which is founded on the very nature of our intellect, the very least among created intellects.
Page 240
We must admit this fact: this fundamental chapter of metaphysics, i.e., regarding act and potency, remains in a state of great intellectual poverty in many manuals when we compare them to the first two books of Aristotle’s Physics and to the commentary that St. Thomas left us concerning it. The method of discovery has been too neglected in philosophy, a method which is founded on the very nature of our intellect, the very least among created intellects.
Page 242
It goes without saying that natural philosophy, conceived after the manner of Aristotle and St. Thomas, does not treat of creation (i.e., the production ex nihilo of the being inasmuch as it is the being of sensi- ble things). This topic pertains to Metaphysics, and it discusses it in an appropriate manner after having proven God’s existence by then discussing His relations with the world. In many scholastic manuals written after the 18th century, creation is instead discussed at the beginning of cosmology, before even having proven the existence of God in rational theology. This represents another disadvantage of the order adopted from the time of Wolff.30
Page 276n6
As some have noted, the ever-present importance of this treatise on prudence would be quite clear to modern thinkers if only two words were added to its title: “Concerning prudence and the connected moral virtues, in relation to the formation of conscience.” Prudence, which directs all the moral virtues, is so fundamental that no human act is good without also being prudent. And despite this fact, numerous modern manuals of moral theology, which do devote a large place to the treatise on conscience, quickly and silently pass over this virtue, the principal car- dinal virtue. They sometimes dedicate only eight or ten pages to it and seem to forget that right and certain conscience is an act of prudence, whose formal object must be determined, as well as its proper nature and connection with the other virtues.