(Also see posting regarding implicit faith)
This is a very rough outline of some things, being posted here from an email where I laid out the stakes of the debate between Francisco Marín-Sola and Reginald Schultes.
Basically M-S and Schultes agree on a good deal (which Schultes takes great pain to say). But there is a very particular question (along with the theoretical underpinning) concerning the definability of specifically scientific conclusions in theology. (Schultes takes great pains to say that they are not the only conclusions in theology - an assertion by him that made me rejoice, in light of what I wrote some years back in NV concerning the sapiential offices of theology. He confirms my insights in that regard.).
What is at stake comes down to the following, if I might ramble it off in voice-to-speech. In St. Thomas and the other high scholastics, the question of dogmatic development is not taken up in detail. Their question was the development of revelation (was the faith in the OT the same as the NT?). You know all the classic texts in St. Thomas of course. So it took some time to develop the question concerning the development of dogma in detail. There are seeds all throughout that era, but it's just not thematic.
Moreover, the distinction between faith and the formal object of theological science is not totally articulated either. (Too many later commentators, I will admit gladly, tend to read back on Thomas the precision of a later age.) But there is a good argument that the position that starts to crystallize around the time of Cajetan can be pushed back into the 14th century debates over this distinction. (The standard example, having great influence on the later Thomists, is how this matter is found in Capreolus. But it can be found in many others. See, for example, just to take one case, the interesting relevant texts published in translation by Antonius de Carlenis. I suspect that reading all of his relevant questions - both theological and logical - would reveal very interesting aspects of all this, historically speaking.) There is, however, a question concerning how to understand the relationship between Cajetan's distinction of the formalities of theological science and faith in relation to what John of St. Thomas says. The latter is claimed, by a certain revision-oriented narrative, to be too much under Suarez's influence concerning the notion of virtual revelation. Philosophically speaking, I think that there is something going on during this period where the thinkers are making important distinctions, that are already implicit in the logic of the prior and posterior analytics, but not developed in full: scientific inferences involve the drawing of new truths which are not formally in the premises. (This obviously can be found all the way back to the 13th century. But to call this, in the supernatural domain, "virtual revelation" is a novelty, I admit. Still, I'm less critical than folks like Donneaud et al.)
You find throughout the period from St. Thomas to John of St. Thomas the general question about what to say concerning the De fide status of truths known through theological science BEFORE and AFTER the Church's definition. This is where all the rub comes down. It actually is still slightly ambiguous at the time of John of St. Thomas, and this ambiguity is reflected, actually in the Reiser edition's first volume. There is a striking footnote against Marin Sola in the critical edition. I was flabbergasted by this and truly wonder about the politics that led to that being added - very unlike the rest of the volume, which does not do such things. But the fact that it is in there shows that he is still at a moment where the settled way of speaking has not 100% crystalized, so there is ambiguity that is seized on by M-S, I believe wrongly, though it is understandable.
But, this becomes fully developed around the time of the Salmanticenses that such conclusions cannot be defined De fide. (Some, like Schultes- and I hold this right now at least - would hold that this is ultimately harmonious with the earlier mainstream of Thomists. Marin-Sola, for his part, in the pages of RT and then in his book on development of dogma holds that it is not, that it is a Suarezian import.). They defend this upon the basis of distinguishing objectively inferential reasoning (formally new truth in the premises) vs. only subjectively illative reasoning (this would take the form of an expository syllogism [basically giving a particular example] or an explicative syllogism [in which the conclusion is only a more distinct / defined statement of the major]). The former (objectively illative) would be called conclusiones quoad se, the latter (subjectively illative, of whatever type) conclusiones quoad nos. (Aside: another example of a good non-inferential kind of knowledge is so-called "immediate inference", usually taught in view of the square of opposition. Such "immediate inference" is not an inference / illation at all, strictly speaking. Maritain explains this well in his formal logic text, though more development is needed on this point.)
It is critical here to realize the importance of the distinction between res et obiectum. This is something that Deely used to harp on, but funny enough it comes up very explicitly in Garrigou, Labourdette, and Schultes. One and the same res is objectifiable in many ways. We see this in the case of definitions very clearly: animal and simian are both genera in relation to man. The one reality (res) of man is multiply objectifiable. This multiplicity in objectifiability is what underlies the work of forming relationes rationis that are second intentions (studied in logic). I'm very sure of all of this, based on my dissertation work and further research. It is a topic woefully understudied by Thomists because it is not found in St. Thomas's very own words....
But, this distinction (of res and obiectum) is also reflected in a more familiar observation: truth is "in the intellect". Speculative truth affirms that two objects of knowledge (=two things objectified as predicate and subject) are one in reality. (This takes place immediately through immediate experience and, more importantly for our purposes, intellectus; it takes place mediately through opinion, science, and wisdom.) One and the same reality (res) can have multiple truths:
God is subsistently and uncreatedly transcendent.
God is subsistently and uncreatedly Esse.
God is subsistently and uncreatedly Beauty.
God is subsistently and uncreatedly Provident.
God is subsistently and uncreatedly knowing of what he creates ("science of vision").
And so forth.
We could do the same thing, too, for, for example, the "metaphysical properties" of man. This term ("metaphysical properties") was used by later scholastics to distinguish that which is a proper predication of a substance as a substance from a predication of an accident which is really distinct from the subject, the latter being called a "physical" property. The terms are weird and awkward, like so much of the technical terminology of scholasticism. But, it's trying to draw attention to the fact that we know certain predicates to be attributable to man in his very substance, not only as proper "accidents" (="physical properties"):
Man is political.
Man is cultural.
Man is, yes, "risible". (I don't like this example, given that these kinds of "repeated" examples have a way of turning the brain more off than on...)
Anyway, such metaphysical properties are not really distinct from the subject in question, but they are objectively / cogntionally distinct. In short: each of those statements are different truths. It is the work of the various sciences to show how per se attributions can prove, mediately, the belonging of those predicates to those subjects.
Here is where M-S's theory comes in. The overall theory is based on several moves at the start of the book, where he distinguishes, first, "physical" and "metaphysical" reasoning. He is using the latter in the sense of "metaphysical properties", though in a very sui generis way (as far as I can tell), he is saying that a "physical demonstration" is based upon the laws of nature and hence have exceptions. This does not seem at all to have anything to do with the distinction between modern science and philosophy of nature (e.g., Simon and Maritain vs. De Koninck and Wallace). I'll be honest I think it is a left over from some bad, half-baked manual. There was a lot of dross still out there. This is not at all a normal way of speaking. (I think that Thomists needed to go in the direction of Maritain and Simon on the science question. But, that is not helped by this notion of "physical" reasoning, which smacks of nominalism: very concerned about how God might exercise His absolute power.)
But, Marin-Sola also provides a division of distinction, broadly like what one finds in a lot of Thomists regarding reasoning reason and reasoned reason. (Personally, I hate this language. I know that some people out there have said that I'm way too technical with my use of scholastic terminology, but on this point, I really think that it's not helpful. Moreover, one has to be very careful to distinguish more carefully than most, here I think even M-S as well, do. A nominal distinction is not the same as a conceptual distinction, correct. But in the latter, too, we must distinguish between a major virtual and a minor virtual distinction. Truth be told it was only VERY recently when trying to teach this to an MA-level course that I finally realized how to do it without sounding like a sorcerer of scholasticism. For this, I owe Austin Woodbury an infinite debt, though, I had to go through several of his "texts" to find the best way to explain it. For your amusement, I'll attach for you an older breakout chart I made some years ago, based upon him.)
Okay, well, this is where we finally hit it: he says that metaphysical demonstrations involve stating something that is not "really" distinct. Now, this is VERY true. (However, there are many scientific demonstrations where there are distinctions in re - many cases where we discuss proper effects would be an example of this. But if it weren't late, I could come up with a list of examples. But I think we can trust each other on this. In scientific inference, there are conclusions that involve assertions about realities that are distinct in reality, but having a per se dependence - and hence being a candidate for founding a scientific illation.) The example of the divine names is one of the clearest cases where his example holds. The various names are only conceptually (or, from the perspective of God, virtually) distinct, by a minor virtual distinction. But they are not really distinct, obviously.
Marin-Sola says that when we draw "metaphysical" (in the peculiar and broad sense of the term mentioned above) inferences about such realities, we in a sense are not saying anything new about reality. Two propositions that have the same subject (e.g. God) and two really (in re) identical predicates would have the same in re meaning / sense . (Even if he perhaps backs away from this claim, his position is still problematic, for reasons to be discussed soon.). But it is obvious that the meaning of these two propositions is not the same, even if they identify one and the same reality in re:
God is subsistently and uncreatedly Esse.
God is subsistently and uncreatedly Beauty.
The judgments bear the mind to different (complex - i.e. 2nd operation of the intellect) objects of knowledge.
They don't have the same sense, even though everything there is one in re.
START ASIDE
But, he goes even further for example, he goes so far as to hold that, for example, the conclusion that God exists is implicit in the premises of something like the First Way - that ultimately it is not a wholly new truth. I need to go back yet again and look in detail at this, but I have run across in now several times in Schultes in articles (and once in the book). He basically holds that the conclusion, though, is an explicitation of the premises, not some kind of new truth - as though the existence of God, for metaphysical reasoning, is just the manifestation of a truth that per se is contained in the notion of created, mobile being. I need to go back and double check if he really means this. But I find no mendacity in Schultes. And I do think that M-S has a congenital weakness in that he is overstating the supposed formal sameness of scientific conclusions in relation to their premises. We must say, by contrast: scientific conclusions are only virtually contained in the premises, but not formally as the same truths. Eh well...
END ASIDE
So, for MS, after much truly learned discussion about history and the various vicissitudes of these matters, he holds that "metaphysical" (always in the sense above) conclusions regarding one and the same in re reality are in the end not new truths but explications of the existing truth.
This is what Schultes (though, I believe, in line with a good branch of scholasticism) objects to. He admits happily: there are conclusions that are concerned with the principles of theology (the truths of faith). This kind of reasoning is not objectively inferential. Think of the various offices of wisdom that I show from Doronzo in that NV article. This would be a series of examples (more developed than what is in Schultes) of what kinds of arguments are possible here. Such truths can be defined De fide. It is a noble office of theology.
Wisdom explicates its principles and shows their interconnection. Such reasoning does not lead to new truths. It is a restatement and appreciation of the principles in a given order. BUT, nonetheless, there are scientific demonstrations with new truths in theology: 1 esse in Christ; the infused moral virtues; perhaps (?) the notion of subsistent relation applied to the persons of the Trinity; the instrumental causality exercised by Christ's sacred humanity; the Thomist theory of sacramental causality by effective-instrumental causality, etc. (Admittedly, there is some further discussion regarding the nature of arguments with two "premises of faith" and one with a "premise of faith" and one "of reason". We'll set that aside. Schultes tends to be talking about the latter. There is a good argument to be made that the former can be de fide defined.). Such new conclusions are new truths, even if they are one in reality. Who would dream of saying that the Thomist theory (well, at least in Cajetan's line of reading - I'm aware of some of the issues here, but even if those are granted, the argument holds) concerning the unified esse of Christ is something de fide. But, I would hold that it is something generally scientifically certain.
So, for Schultes, can such truths be defined? Yes, but here we get ourselves into another thicket. They are definable in terms of ecclesiastical faith. As you know, this notion has a checkered history, having become famous by its application in the Jansenist controversy, so that authorities in Paris could condemn the Jansenists in view of the "dogmatic fact" that Jansen himself was in error. Whatever might be said about those particularities, this notion of "ecclesiastical faith" was a bit of a mess, tied up in all of the other related topics of discursive faith, etc. And I have waffled on it myself. It is denied vigorously by Marin-Sola, but also by Gardeil, Garrigou, Doronzo, Labourdette, and others. Schultes holds it because it would be an assent based upon the formal motive, not of God revealing, but of the infallible assistance that we know the Church to have from the Holy Spirit. Here, the "division" of truth is almost identical with what we today call de fide tenenda. In fact, the language of the CDF document speaking of this uses language almost the same as the older language of Ecclesiastical faith. The foundation in Lumen Gentium is almost certainly based on the scholastic category of assent. (In fact, from what I understand, Vatican I was - prematurely, I would think - hoping to define something about the definitive authority of the Church in just such matters: definitive, yes, but not credenda de fide.). By saying that it is "de fide tenenda" the CDF wisely allowed the exact question of theories of assent / censure to remain vague.
Thus, when the Church does definitively teach about some moral matter that is not revealed but is connected essentially with revelation, it is a question of something defined by Ecclesiastical faith. I'm wary of the notion, I admit. But, I also think that it is very true that we absolutely cannot say that every definitive teaching is believed because of the formal motive of infused faith: God has not Himself immediately revealed all of those truths. Such "mediate" and reasoned-out revelation (though proposed authoritatively by the Church) must have some mark of difference in its assent. But, I will leave that matter stand for now. (Ramirez has an interesting solution if you are ever interested. I'm not sure, though, if I could subscribe to it either.). But, in any case, this is at the heart of contemporary debates. We need to revisit and resolve, at long last, the question of Ecclesiastical faith, one way or the other.
Thus, to sum it all up. The question comes down to this:
For Schultes (and many classic Thomists): There is objective inference / illation involved in properly scientific conclusions in theology, most markedly in cases where philosophical truths are directly super-elevated by theological discourse (the use of a "premise of reason").
These inferences are not the only ones that take place in theology. But they are present, insofar as theology is scientific in nature (though it is more than science - for it is wisdom).
And although they might open up on the same reality, they do not always enunciate the same truths as the premises involved.
Therefore, to say that they are De fide definable is to hold that the Church can define as revealed a new truth. This cannot be called anything other than a new revelation.... (Interestingly, as far as I know, Suarez almost went so far as to allow for something akin to this, though he tried to minimize the implications.... I look forward to a paper by Fr. Pidel at the upcoming conference, for I want to hear the most kind interpretation possible. But even Juan de Lugo and many later SJs, even Suarezians, had to differ with their great master.)
But, on many points Schultes does agree with Marin-Sola. He thinks, perspicuously in my opinion, that M-S is perhaps more correct about theological progress than dogmatic progress.