Transcendental and Predicamental Relation (and, More Generally, relatio secundum esse)

I thought it would be good to reproduce here a topic from Woodbury that is very pertinent to discussions John Deely has undertaken in recent history.  It has also come to the surface in some other topics among philosophers who are actually paying attention to some later-day scholastics.  I felt the need to include this in a note for a book that I am translating.  I thought it might be helpful to put it online as well.  I know that I long searched for this sort of thing in the midst of the deserts in which we live in this dark ecclesial era.

Austin M. Woodbury, Ostensive Metaphysics, The John N. Deely and Anthony F. Russell Collection, St. Vincent College Library, Latrobe, PA, n.1201 (p.930-932):

n. 1201 Transcendental and Predicamental Relation

But real relation itself is twofold, according as it is either a pure relation, i.e. nought except a relation, such as sonship, or is together some absolute being, [e.g.] a quality, such as sight, which besides being a relation to vision and to colour, is also a quality.  A pure real relation is called a predicamental relation, which is a pure order towards other, so that it is not together some absolute being; wherefore it is named ‘predicamental’, since it constitutes a special mode of being really distinct from every absolute mode of being.  This predicamental relation is a real purely relative accident superadded to its subject, this subject being constituted related to another: not formally through itself, but formally through this accident really distinct from itself.  Examples are fatherhood, sonship, equality, similarity.

But a real relation which is together some absolute being is called a transcendental relation: because it extends itself beyond the special predicament of relation and is found in all the predicaments or modes of being ([e.g.] in substance, quality, etc.).  A transcendental relation accordingly is the very entity of some absolute being from its very essence ordered towards another, or proportioned or adapted or adjusted to another, as matter from its very essence is ordered towards form, or essence towards be [i.e. existence], or act towards object.  Therefore, a transcendental relation is nothing else than the very essence of a being, which is not only a relation, as it is adapted or ordered towards another—as the essence of sight (which is not merely a relation, but is a quality) is adapted or ordered towards vision and color; wherefore, it is nothing else than an essential adaptation of a thing that is not a mere or pure relation.  Accordingly, that which is related through a transcendental relation is constituted related: formally through its own entity, so that it is its own relation, not formally through a relation really distinct from its entity—in this case, its order or adaptation to another would be only accidental, not essential.

It is manifest from what has just been said that: whereas, as will be explained later (cf. n.1206), in predicamental relation there is real distinction between these four: the relation itself, its subject, its foundation, and its term; when it is a question of transcendental relation, there is real identity between the relation itself and its subject, and its foundation, the only real distinction lying between tht one reality which is together these three and the term.

From what has just been said follow two further distinctions between predicamental and transcendental relation.  First indeed, whereas predicamental relation respects its term as a pure term; transcendental relation, on the contrary, respects its term, not as a pure term, but as that whereunto the subject is essentially adapted, to wit, as specificative, or perfective, or complement, or proper subject.  But secondly, whereas predicamental relation perishes if its term does not really actually exist, since its sole office is to refer the subject to that term as to a term—which it cannot do if that which is the term does not exist; transcendental relation, on the contrary, does not require that its term really exist actually, since something can be essentially adapted to another without the real actual existence of that other; thus, for example, [the] human soul is transcendentally related to the human body, but can exist after the body has ceased to exist; also, there can be science of an object which does not exist really ([e.g.] logic, whose object is mental being [entia rationis, namely relationes rationis that are second intentions].

It is to be noted that the distinction of real relation into predicamental relation and transcendental relation does not fully coincide with the distinction, commonly made by St. Thomas and the ancient scholastics, of relation into ‘relation according to [existence] (secundum esse)’ and ‘relation according to be-spoken (secundum dici).’  See ST I q.13 a.7 ad 1.  For, they called by the name of “relation according to [existence]” every pure relation or relation whose whole [existence] is [to]-[exist]-towards-other, wheter such relation be real (and then it is predicamental) or mental; for also of mental relation is it true that its whole [existence] is towards other.  See De potentia, q.7 a.10 ad 11.  While, they called by the name ‘relation according to be-spoken,’ the relation that is together some absolute being (and this is transcendental relation): inasmuch as such absolute beings are understood and are defined and therefore are-spoken through reference to another; as potency is understood and is defined and is-spoken through reference towards act, and similarly matter through reference to form, and similarly sight through reference to vision and colour, and similarly habit through reference to its operation and object.”

God's Existence

Levering, Matthew.  Proofs of God: Classical Arguments from Tertullian to Barth.  Grand Rapids, MI: 2016

I am working my way through Levering's text for an HPR review.  On the whole, excellent introduction to a number of thinkers.  This kind of book is constricted by its overall format—quickly surveying many thinkers.  However, that is just the nature of the beast.  Provides a good overall narrative that can then be fleshed out by particular selections that would match a teacher / professor's taste and desires.  I may differ a bit on this or that figure that is included.  For instance, one wishes that he would give more direct attention to Scotus (instead of primarily as a foil for Ockham).  Other points could be raised in this regard.  Nonetheless, it would be churlish!

For fairness, I will add that this genre is not my favorite, but that is not a mark against Levering's excellent text.  I tend toward a dogmatic mania for systematization.  There is much to be gained from engaging with numerous thinkers like this.  Just to take an example, though I am no candidate for being a Blondelian, I have much now to think about regarding the exigencies of practico-practical knowledge of God.  I think Maritain got this generally correct.  However, the profound depths of the matter must be plumbed.  I suspect that a number of points are slurred by Blondel.  Nonetheless, like many modern thinkers, he has a sensitivity for the order of practice (here, especially, for moral thought).  However, one must always differentiate speculativo-practical and practico-practico judgments.

A thought, not directly related to Levering, but interesting—a proof of God's existence through ars in a way that is similar to prudentia?

Logical and Metaphysical Universal

This selection is taken from the schematic found on Austin M. Woodbury, Logic, The John N. Deely and Anthony F. Russel Collection, St. Vincent College Library, Latrobe, PA, 63.

More to come later, for I will likely be reworking some of these texts:

"The Universal [sic] is something REAL or the NATURE OF THE THING, which if it be considered . . .  as ABSTRACTED from real existence . . . but not from mental existence, is universal and can be considered either in itself AS REGARDS THE THING CONCEIVED, [in which case] it is the METAPHYSICAL UNIVERSAL, or relatively to inferiors (OR, AS REGARDS MODE [sic] OF CONCEIVING), whose property is PREDICABILITY, which is aptitude for predication, [in which case] it is the LOGICAL UNIVERSAL"

Modes of Knowing

This selection is adapted from Austin M. Woodbury, Logic, The John N. Deely and Anthony F. Russel Collection, St. Vincent College Library, Latrobe, PA, 120-121.

The general issue to be considered here are the instruments that logic furnishes for the the manifestation of truth, enabling us to proceed from a vague knowledge to a distinct knowledge.  We should note here the pivotal role played in this by means definitions and divisions.  These are often ignored even though they are what bring about the perfection of the first operation of the intellect.  Nous has its own instruments or "procedures" for bringing clarity out of the nebulous cloud from which insight first emerges.

Notion of "Mode of Knowing"

First, we must consider what we mean by a "mode of knowing."  At first, the human intellect knows nothing perfectly but, instead, has knowledges that are obscure, confused, or doubtful.  To perfect its knowledge, the intellect uses logical instruments that we call "modes of knowing."  For this reason, a mode of knowing is defined as, "A discourse that is manifestive of something that is unknown"—oratio alicuius ignoti manifestiva.  Here, we do not mean by "unknown" that something is utterly unknown.  Instead, we take "unknown" for obscure, confused, or doubtful.

Division of the Modes of Knowing

Now, we must consider the division of modes of knowing accepted by the Thomistic school.  There are two sorts of unknowns that we may need to make manifest, namely something that is incomplex (simple) or something that is a complex truth.  Now, with regard to incomplex things (which are the simple essence of a thing), manifestation occurs either (1) with regard to its constitution or (2) with regard to its parts.  Its constitution is manifested by means of definitions, while it is manifested with regard to its parts by means of divisions.  However, as regards a complex truth, i.e. the logical truth found only in judgments (which are logically complex), manifestation occurs by means of proof or argumentation. 

Thus, there are are three modes of knowing, namely:

1. Definition
2. Division
3. Argumentation

However, it is important to note that a term is not, of itself, a logical instrument (i.e. a mode of knowing), except in a remote manner.  This is so because we do not bring our knowledge to perfection by means of terms by themselves.  They only play a role in such perfecting of knowledge when they are conjoined to one another in some special way—i.e. inasmuch as definitions, divisions, or argumentations are formed from termsInasmuch as these latter three are the "modes of knowing" that we are discussing here (namely, with regard to the perfecting of human knowledge), they are the modes of knowing that we are concerned with here.

Also, we should note that sense experience, by which we know the truth of a fact is not a mode of knowing, for the truth of a fact known by sense experience does not need a medium whereby it is manifested.

Likewise, faith, by which something is believed on the testimony of a witness, is not a mode of knowledge because it does not manifest the thing itself but, instead, leave it obscure.

Finally, we can concede that logic itself is indeed a mode of knowing.  However, it is only such ain a universal manner (given that it provides the universal instrument for directing human knowledge), but not in a specific manner.

A Few Thoughts on Education from Maritain

The following are taken from Jacques Maritain, "Science, Philosophy and Faith"

"An army in which anybody may be a general is not the army of democracy but of stupidity.  A republic of knowledge in which each type of knowledge claimed for itself the architectonic rank, or where it was declared that no one body of knowledge had a higher rank than any other, or a superordinate regulative role, would be a republic of ignorance."

"In truth, the need for order and for unity is unescapable.  If one denies the conditions of a true and natural unity, in which the degrees of knowledge—each one autonomous at its level, each one having its own jurisdiction and its own specific truth to know—are distributed according to the nature of their objects, one would ultimately come to ask of the social or political obedience of the thinking subjects, or of their racial or national endowment, an absurd and despotic unity of the spirit.  One would dress physics, biology, mathematics, philosophy and theology in the same brown or red shirt.  One would proclaim, to the great shame of the human spirit—and we have heard of such things—the constitutional unity and single dignity of sciences of pure Aryan or German blood or of the sciences of pure Marxist-Leninist persuasion.  And they alone, once regimented, would have the right to exist."

"If it is denied that there is a true and natural hierarchy of the degrees of knowledge, disposed according to their purpose, one will be led not to suppress all hierarchy, but to subordinate wisdom to science and to ascribe the regulative role of the sciences to a lower order, which actually amounts to refusing existence to the higher sciences and to wisdom, and to the truths which it is their mission to dispense among men. Let us not delude ourselves; an education in which the sciences of phenomena and the corresponding techniques take precedence over philosophical and theological knowledge is already, potentially, a Fascist education; an education in which biology, hygiene and eugenics provide the supreme criteria of morality is already, potentially, a Fascist education."

Random Readings—Maritain, Benedict, etc.

Of late, I have been doing much random readings while work on my translation of a book by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange and also address some final dissertation issues.  The recent Last Testament of Benedict XVI has given me pause to think on some matters.  Reading about his early assignments teaching, he clearly was a good-ol'-fashioned German academic.  Though generally I despise that ideal of "scholarship" (i.e. soulless pedantry that is disconnected from life), dear Ratzinger had enough soul to avoid that pitfall.  (I will note, however, that the German / continental approach also does produce mastery that we rarely find in the US—mastery that I know I sorely lack too.)  Interestingly, he says he would have spent his time discussing the nature of theology and proximate matters.  We do have his essays to this end in Principles of Catholic Theology.  Given his lack of formal and rigorous philosophical training (and, yes, I mean good ol' scholastic philosophy), I'm glad he didn't write in detail on these matters.  Essays help to sound out the matters.  However, the last thing that we needed in the post-conciliar period was yet another account of the nature of theology that doesn't ground itself in the sane discussions of earlier scholastic thinkers.

Also, revisited Simon's Critique of Moral Knowledge to put together some initial notes for a some-day prolegomena to moral philosophy.  However, as I re-read certain sections of my dissertation, I think it will be important for me to pen some brief prolegomena to the study of logic from a Thomistic perspective.  Not that I find everything in my dissertation to my liking any more.... Still, this general topic needs to be laid out clearly.  I find it vexing how most Thomists completely miss the nature of second intentions.  But, Deely himself noted this well many times in his career.

Finally, have been going through some unpublished and untranslated works of Maritain.  Excellent stuff.  Wonderful little accessible essay on the degrees of knowledge.  I will almost certainly use it as something in an introduction course / lecture some day.